Key Takeaways
- In recent
years, China has taken a more assertive role in global governance, aiming
to position itself as a key player and potential emerging leader in the
“Global South.”
- Beijing
is seeking to create a coalition of countries that support its vision of a
multipolar world order, with Africa playing a central part in this
strategy.
- China’s
military diplomacy and security engagement with African nations has served
in bolstering its political and economic influence on the continent.
- Beijing
has evolved from being a norm-taker to a norm-shaper in its approach,
promoting aspects of its governance model in Africa’s security
architecture.
- China’s
increasing normative influence in African security presents challenges for
the EU’s engagement on the continent, necessitating a reassessment of its
approach to security cooperation with African nations.
Introduction
In recent decades, China has
actively sought to position itself as a pivotal partner and emerging leader
within the Global South. Despite the lack of clear consensus on the definition
of “Global South” or a definitive list of countries it includes, the term holds
considerable symbolic value. It embodies a shared sentiment among developing
nations, characterized by a “sense
of economic or financial disadvantage, frustrations with Western paternalism
and neo-colonial attitudes”, and a collective drive for a more equitable global
governance architecture.
China’s engagement with Africa
has emerged as a critical element of its Global South strategy.
Fostering stronger ties
with African nations aligns with Beijing’s aims to create a multipolar global
order and new norms that advance its geostrategic, political, and economic
interests. China’s strategy has notably evolved to include a more assertive
role in shaping Africa’s security architecture. While initially focused on
establishing itself as a reliable security partner, Beijing has gradually
expanded its normative influence, promoting military governance
models based on its Party-military model.
These dynamics present
strategic implications for the EU, requiring a nuanced understanding of China’s
growing role in African security to assess challenges and impacts on EU interests.
Strategically
Harnessing the Global South
African countries have grown increasingly
disillusioned with Western security engagement on the continent, often viewing
it as driven by interventionist policies and strategies prioritizing external
interests rather than addressing the root causes of instability in Africa. Furthermore, despite years of engagement, Western-led
efforts have largely failed to resolve
long-standing security challenges, a persistent source of frustration for
local populations.
This mounting discontent has
contributed to the rise of anti-Western sentiment and the surge of military
coups across the continent. In March 2024, Niger and Chad announced the
cancellation of their military cooperation agreements with Washington and
demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In Mali and Burkina Faso,
repeated popular demonstrations have also called for an end to the French
military presence. These movements culminated in the forced withdrawal of
French forces from Mali in 2023, marking the end of France’s decade-long Operation Barkhane mission.
Critics argue that the
operation largely served France’s strategic interests, particularly its
influence in former colonies and resource access.
These developments represent
a significant setback for EU foreign and security policy, as they have fueled the
desire among many African nations to seek alternative partnerships, including with
China. Presenting itself as a “natural member” of the Global South, Beijing
highlights shared historical grievances and the collective struggle against imperialism and
colonialism to foster a sense of solidarity and strategically frame its
partnership as based on mutual respect and benefits. Moreover, China’s non-interference policy
is frequently emphasized as a critical distinction to the Western
approach, often criticized as paternalistic and interventionist. This
approach resonates with African leaders who feel that the EU’s approachtends to undermine African agency, while China has placed a strong emphasis on answering calls for greater
support in developing “African solutions to African problems.”
China's Early Engagement in African
Security
China’s evolving military
engagement reflects a strategy aimed at gaining diplomatic legitimacy and
protecting its economic interests through adherence to international norms. At
the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, then-Chinese Minister of Defense, Liang Guanlie, emphasized
China’s intent to act as a responsible power in global security rather than an
expansionist one. Aside from participation in UN peacekeeping missions, Beijing
largely limited its military activities as deployments to what it considers as its
own territory and maritime areas, signaling a commitment to established
international standards rather than challenging them. However, as China’s
economic footprint expanded, its military strategy adapted, marked by China’s
growing involvement in Africa’s security.
The establishment of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 formalized Beijing’s
relationship with Africa. FOCAC has since facilitated China’s expanding
influence through official channels, increasing its involvement in African
security through UN missions and anti-piracy operations. Driven by growing
economic interests, China’s security activities in Africa became more
pronounced. Since 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted escort missions in
the Gulf of Aden to protect critical shipping lanes. In 2013, China sent combat
troops to Mali as part of a UN peacekeeping mission,
and in 2015, it deployed an infantry battalion to South Sudan, where
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has significant oil investments.
These actions highlight China’s willingness to directly safeguard its overseas
assets, and, if needed, evacuate them.
China conducted an
evacuation operation in Yemen in 2015,
relocating 629 Chinese nationals and 279 foreigners to Djibouti. Subsequently,
in 2016, China’s defense ministry confirmed the construction of a logistical support facility
in Djibouti. Officially intended to support anti-piracy patrols, this base also
enables non-combatant evacuations, peacekeeping operations, and intelligence
gathering. In 2023, China further demonstrated its capacity by evacuating citizens from Sudan.
Beijing’s
Emerging Role as a Norm-Shaper in African Security
China has progressively assumed
a more assertive role in African security, shifting from a norm-taker to a
norm-shaper approach. This shift aligns with President Xi Jinping’s broader goal
of enhancing China’s global influence and promoting an alternative governance model.
The change of paradigm in Beijing’s foreign policy has also brought about a “more
flexible and pragmatic” interpretation of its long-standing non-interference principle, enabling more proactive
stance in conflicts resolution.
While China has employed various
strategies to influence the norms of peace and security governance on the
continent, a key approach has been the establishment of defense dialogue platforms.
In 2018, China unveiled the “China-Africa Security
Cooperation Initiative”, which provides financial resources and personnel
for capacity-building within the African Union (AU), alongside participation in
peacekeeping missions and anti-piracy operations. The August 2023 summit
saw China pledging increased support for “humanitarian aid, military education,
peacekeeping, and counterterrorism assistance.” In 2022, Beijing also spearheaded the
creation of the Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa, focusing
on security, development, and governance to “support regional peace and
development through concrete action.” Beijing has used both these platforms to
advance its Global Security Initiative
(GSI) – repeatedly emphasized as a guiding framework
for cooperation. It is touted as a new pathway for African nations to
effectively address security challenges at their root by tackling development
and governance in parallel with security measures.
Another critical element of
China’s normative strategy is Political military work,
encompassing the activities of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) aimed at “shaping the civilian environment to achieve the
political, ideological, and military goals set by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).” This strategy contributes both to advance the strategic interests of
the CCP and propagate the values and norms of the Chinese party-state. A key
aspect of these efforts is Professional Military Education (PME), which
includes training programs, military exchanges and capacity-building
initiatives. China views PME as a strategic tool to promote its party-army
model, where the party has absolute leadership
over the military– a principle rooted in Mao Zedong’s adage that “the party
controls the gun.” This ensures the military’s loyalty to the ruling party,
preventing shifts in allegiance or challenges to authority.
Many African ruling parties
have embraced this approach, as it aligns with their priorities
of consolidating and maintaining power while preventing military coups or insurrections.
This has resulted in the adoption of similar governance structures in several
African countries, where military leaders and government officials trained in
China have been instrumental in embedding these norms. For instance, Angola’s MPLA has
adopted a model similar to China's, whereby high-ranking officers are closely
tied to the ruling party. This has helped the MPLA secure the military's
loyalty, consolidate dominance in Angolan politics and maintain long-term
political stability. Similarly, the Ethiopian National Defense
Force (ENDF) operates in close alignment with the ruling party,
mirroring the CCP's control over the PLA.
The impact of Chinese
military training programs in boosting China’s political influence on the
continent is evident in the rise of alumni to high-ranking functions within
their respective institutions. The PLA Army Command College alone has trained
at least 10 African heads of defense departments, eight defense ministers, as
well as presidents, prime ministers and other national leaders. Notably, Zimbabwe’s sitting
president Emmerson Mnangagwa received military training in the PLA academy in
Nanjing during the liberation war. His experience in China has influenced his
leadership and governance style, and he has maintained strong ties with Beijing
throughout his political career. General Gabriel Jok Riak,
former Chief of Defense Forces of South Sudan, also used his military training
in China to strengthen South Sudan's military forces and deepen its strategic
ties with Beijing.
Enhancing party-to-party
diplomacy and outreach has also benefited China’s security engagement in Africa.
This includes the establishment of training programs that integrate ideological
education promoting regime or party control in line with China’s fused party-state
model. A significant development in this strategy is the opening of the
FLMSA’s Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Academy in Tanzania in 2022. Funded by a 40 million USD grant from
the CCP’s International Liaison Department, it serves as a platform for China to
“share its experience in governance more systematically with like-minded
political organizations.” While strengthening ties with current ruling African parties
and elites, it also aims to shape positive perceptions and understanding of
China’s political governance among the younger generation, poised to become the
future political elites. As part of the training, professors from Renmin
University delivered lectures on China’s
“Party history, Party-building and experience in state governance.” An
attending Namibian official has stated the Central Party School instructor emphasized that “party
discipline should be above and outside the law.”
Finally, China has further consolidated
its political influence in Africa by promoting Chinese policing norms within
African police forces. According to a report from the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, “Between 2018 and 2021 over 2,000 African police and law
enforcement personnel received training
in China.” The training typically includes instruction on Chinese policing
techniques, which are heavily focused on maintaining public order, ensuring
loyalty to the state, and suppressing dissent. Participants are exposed to the
Chinese model of law enforcement, which integrates extensive surveillance,
strict social control, and the prioritization of state security over individual
rights. Many African countries have begun adopting Chinese
surveillance technology, including facial recognition systems, mass
surveillance cameras, and data analytics platforms, to enhance police and
security forces’ capabilities.
Implications
for EU Stakeholders & Policy Recommendations
While the EU has traditionally
held a strong role in Africa’s security architecture, its relationship with
African nations remains complex, shaped by historical legacies and a colonial
past. The EU’s approach has often fallen short of addressing core grievances,
in particular calls for greater African agency. In this context, China’s
rapidly expanding influence in African security and normative efforts to shape the
region’s security architecture carries several strategic implications for the
EU.
Firstly, China’s deepening
engagement is likely to accelerate the trend of African countries distancing
themselves from European security partners. Following the path of Mali, Burkina
Faso, and Niger, other nations like Chad or Sudan might also be inclined to seek
alternative partnerships. Secondly, while both EU stakeholders and China agree
on the importance of a peaceful and stable Africa, Beijing’s growing
ideological and normative influence contrasts with the EU’s value-driven
approach. This divergence risks weakening the EU’s diplomatic leverage to
encourage democratic reforms while strengthening authoritarian trends. Military
juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have capitalized on Chinese support to consolidate their power,
indirectly enabling them to delay democratic transitions or intensify
repression against dissent.
Furthermore, China’s
promotion of ideological education that emphasizes party or regime control
could contribute to eroding democratic principles and proper civil-military
relations. The training programs contain lessons on PRC practices which have,
in some cases, infringed or indirectly aided infringement of personal freedoms
and individual rights. This includes, for example, training on dual-purpose technologies
that could be exploited to access individuals’ data in ways that expand state
surveillance and control over citizens’ personal lives.
China’s consolidated
influence in Africa is helping to build support for its normative efforts in
international fora. In 2020, Beijing introduced a resolution at the Human
Rights Council on “Promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of
human rights”, which was supported by all African nations. This resolution promotes
human rights norms that are more aligned with China’s views, including non-interference.
This alternative approach to human rights poses challenges as it could
contribute to reducing accountability for human rights violations.
EU stakeholders need to
reassess their approach to security engagement on the continent to better
address the calls from African leaders for more equal partnerships. This would
entail boosting efforts to support the development of an African-led peace and
security architecture and promoting initiatives that enhance African agency. Increased
capacity-building support for the African security actors, including the AU, would
enable more effective responses to regional crises, aligning with the EU’s
interests. Finally, despite divergences in approach, it
is important for the EU to explore pragmatic cooperation with China in Africa to support regional stability and development where
possible. Framing Beijing solely as a competitor or rival risks being perceived
as undermining African agencies in choosing partners, thereby hindering
opportunities for constructive engagement.
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Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
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Image credit: President Kagame and
First Lady Jeannette Kagame welcome C… | Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
