Executive Summary
The strategic convergence between Russia, Iran, and China poses a growing systemic threat to the European Union. Despite differing regional agendas, these three powers are increasingly aligned in key areas such as cybersecurity, military technology transfers, intelligence cooperation, and disinformation campaigns. Their coordinated efforts undermine the EU’s critical infrastructure, weaken its strategic autonomy, and erode trust in democratic institutions by targeting sectors such as energy, finance, healthcare, and electoral integrity. Although the EU has implemented sanctions and reinforced its cybersecurity framework, it continues to address these actors largely in isolation, failing to recognize the cumulative security impact of their trilateral cooperation. Particular vulnerabilities include the transfer of advanced knowledge and dual-use technologies via academic and industrial partnerships with China, the use of hybrid warfare tactics by Iran—including cyberattacks and propaganda—and Russia’s ongoing infiltration of European digital networks and information ecosystems. To address this, the EU must adopt a coherent, forward-looking strategythat moves beyond fragmented responses. This entails the establishment of a centralized threat assessment hub coordinating intelligence from Member States, the restriction of academic and technological partnerships with high-risk third countries, the reinforcement of cyber resilience through joint infrastructure protection drills with NATO, and the creation of a targeted investment mechanism to reduce dependency on foreign critical technologies. These concrete instruments, when integrated, can strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities, reduce strategic dependencies, and safeguard its democratic and technological sovereignty.
Policy Recommendations
- The EU should adopt a coherent strategy to counter foreign interference, especiallyconsidering threats originating from China, Russia and Iran.
- The EU should implement the European Parliament’s recommendations on protecting democratic processes from disinformation, fake news and external influence.
- It is imperative to strengthen the EU’s cyber defense systems, boost resources to counter cyberespionage by China, Russia and Iran and deepen its cooperation with NATO on critical infrastructure protection.
- The balance between cooperation and protection must be upheld, especially in light of the academic and cultural cooperation with countries such as China.
Introduction
The growing cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran in the fields of cybersecurity and intelligence represents a systemic threat to the stability and security of the European Union. Although these three states differ in their geopolitical priorities, they converge around a shared strategic objective: to weaken the European Union by destabilizing it across multiple domains, ranging from military pressure to technological interference. This trilateral alignment is underpinned by several key mechanisms, including the exchange of intelligence, the transfer of advanced technologies, coordinated cyberattacks, and mutual political and technological support. China, in particular, provides Russia and Iran with dual-use technologies—such as semiconductors, surveillance systems, and software employed in intelligence operations—thereby acting as a technological enabler for their subversive agendas. Joint efforts extend to the realm of information warfare, notably disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic institutions within the EU and eroding the political and social cohesion of its member states. While Russia plays a leading role in launching cyberattacks and penetrating Western institutions, Iran contributes through both cyber capabilities and ideological amplification, particularly via proxy networks and targeted disinformation. China, meanwhile, facilitates systemic disruption through long-term knowledge and technology extraction, and by enabling the operational capacity of its partners through advanced infrastructure. Thus, each actor contributes differently: Russia leads tactical cyber aggression, Iran amplifies narratives and supports militant proxies, and China sustains the strategic backbone through access, innovation, and industrial leverage. Although the EU has acknowledged some of these risks, significant blind spots remain—particularly in areas of academic, technological, and economic cooperation—where mechanisms of infiltration often go unnoticed. These blind spots are systematically exploited, not only through espionage and disinformation, but also through legitimate-seeming collaborations in science, trade, and infrastructure. Against this backdrop, the coordinated actions of Russia, Iran, and China constitute one of the most pressing challenges to European security, necessitating a comprehensive and unified response.
Evidence and dimensions of the tripartite cooperation
An analysis of available sources indicates that the cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China stems from a shared strategic calculus. Each of these states views the European Union as a geopolitical adversary and a structural barrier to the realization of their respective ambitions on the international stage.
Cybersecurity: Russia, Iran, and China – Cooperation and Threats to the European Union"
In recent years, trilateral cooperation in the cyber domain has intensified. Russia, Iran, and China have been exchanging cyber technologies, conducting joint hacking operations, coordinating ransomware attacks, and launching disinformation campaigns targeting strategic sectors of the EU economy. This section examines the mechanisms of this cooperation in order to identify the key threats and their implications for Europe’s digital security.
Russia, Iran, and China are actively developing joint cyberattack strategies. In January 2025, Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes provisions for cybersecurity collaboration. This agreement focuses on coordinated efforts to counter the misuse of information and communication technologies and to manage national internet segments, thereby expanding state control over the digital space[1]. Meanwhile, China and Russia have deepened their cybersecurity partnership by aligning their technical capacities and legal frameworks. Their goal is to promote a new cyber order based on state sovereignty and collective security, positioning themselves as leaders in the global digital arena[2]. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has consistently identified Russia, China, and Iran as persistent cyber threats. According to the 2025 Threat Assessment Report, these states possess both the technical capabilities and political intent to launch operations targeting critical infrastructure and democratic institutions. The 2025 Threat Assessment highlights these nations' capabilities and willingness to launch cyber operations that could disrupt U.S. national security[3]. Iran has implemented Russian techniques to mask cybercrime and is using China's digital surveillance model to create its own sanctions evasion and surveillance systems[4]. Between 2021 and 2024, cyberattacks by Iranian hackers increased by 40%, with the majority targeting EU state institutions and the financial sector. China, in turn, provides Russia and Iran with advanced espionage technologies and tools that are used to attack European critical infrastructure systems[5]. In 2022, Chinese surveillance systems enabled the infiltration of European telecommunications networks and financial services. In addition, Russia and China regularly launch cyberattacks on the European energy, financial and transport sectors[6]. In 2023, more than 60% of cyberattacks against EU institutions originated from entities linked to Russian and Chinese cybercriminal groups. One of the most destructive attacks was the infection of the power system in Central Europe, which led to many hours of power outages[7]. Iran also plays a key role in the development of cybercrime in the EU. In 2022, Iranian hackers launched 140 ransomware attacks on organizations in the EU, generating financial losses of more than €1.2 billion. These attacks mainly affected the health, banking, and transportation sectors, and were designed to encrypt data and extort ransom[8]. Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies cooperate intensively in the areas of cyberespionage, data interception and infiltration of EU information systems[9]. In 2023, 25% of detected data breaches in the EU resulted from actions sponsored by third countries, mainly China and Russia. Iran provides hacking tools to take over administrative accounts in European organizations[10]. One of the examples is the 2023 operation in which Iranian hackers used forged security certificates to gain access to EU banking systems, causing the data of 4 million users to be leaked. In addition to the hacking attacks, Russia, Iran and China are conducting coordinated disinformation campaigns to further destabilize Europe[11]. In 2022, more than 500 disinformation campaigns were detected that aimed to undermine EU citizens' trust in their governments and international institutions. In 2023, a media campaign was organized to spread information about alleged "secret agreements" between EU governments and pharmaceutical corporations[12].
In conclusion, Russia, Iran, and China are not only exchanging technologies to facilitate cybercrime but are also executing coordinated digital operations that directly threaten the European Union. The greatest danger lies in the proliferation of ransomware, cyberespionage, and disinformation activities—tools deliberately used to destabilize the EU economy and disrupt societal cohesion by undermining trust in public institutions and critical sectors such as healthcare.
Knowledge and Technology Transfer: Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China and the Threats to the European Union.
The transfer of knowledge and technology between Russia, Iran, and China constitutes a key pillar of their joint strategy to enhance geopolitical influence and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. This cooperation operates through formal state partnerships as well as informal and opaque channels—including “private” actors, front companies, and academic institutions—often routed through jurisdictions such as Hong Kong to mask state involvement. China, for example, has provided Russia with critical components such as microelectronics and processors essential for the production of missiles and precision-guided munitions. In exchange, Russia has shared advanced military technologies with China, including submarine and stealth capabilities. Similarly, Iran has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, potentially receiving sensitive technological assistance in exchange[13]. The consequences of this strategic partnership are particularly severe for the European Union, which academic, research, and industrial institutions are not only targeted directly, but are often exploited through seemingly legitimate joint projects.The European Parliament has explicitly acknowledged that foreign interference and espionage activities have intensified within EU academic institutions, with China, Russia, and Iran identified as primary perpetrators.[14] Due to the strategic value of their advanced scientific research and technological innovation, these institutions have become prime targets for foreign intelligence activities. The European Parliament has acknowledged that EU universities are being targeted by foreign interference and espionage, notably from China, Russia, or Iran. These actions calling for concrete actions such as stricter eligibility criteria for EU-funded research projects, the creation of a centralized risk assessment mechanism, enhanced background checks for foreign-affiliated researchers, and stronger enforcement of export controls in sensitive technological domains. Despite warnings from MI5 about potential espionage threats, several British universities have continued collaborations with Chinese institutions linked to the defense sector[15].
Russia and Iran have been developing intensive academic and research cooperation for years. Between 2017 and 2019, more than 35,000 Chinese students studied in Russia, and more than 20,000 Russians studied in China[16]. This figures, while notable, remain significantly lower than Chinese student populations in countries such as the United States (over 350,000 during the same period) and in Germany (over 35,000 annually), highlighting the strategic—not commercial—dimension of these cooperation. Exchange programs include fields such as artificial intelligence, cryptography, and advanced information systems, which can have both civilian and military applications. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization University and BRICS University, these countries fund research on cybersecurity, quantum engineering and military systems[17]. While presented as academic partnerships, they serve as mechanisms for the transfer of strategic knowledge that may be leveraged in hybrid warfare. For the European Union, such cooperation poses a growing threat, as it facilitates the accumulation and circulation of sensitive expertise among actors known to challenge the international rules-based order. The integration of academic infrastructure into broader geopolitical strategies risks undermining Europe’s technological edge and security architecture.
The European Union finds itself at the center of global technological competition. In 2023, as many as 25% of cyberattacks on academic institutions in the EU were aimed at stealing quantum engineering and artificial intelligence research[18]. The leakage of such technologies may result in a significant increase in the military potential of Russia, Iran and China, which in the long run will weaken the strategic advantage of the West.
Transfer of Military and Industrial Technologies
A key pillar of strategic cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China is the transfer of military and dual-use industrial technologies. China has supplied Russia with 90% of imported microelectronics components, which are crucial for the Russian defense industry[19]. In addition, China has provided Russia with parts for missile systems and drones, helping to modernize its military equipment[20]. Iran also plays a significant role in the Russian defense industry, providing Moscow with more than 4,600 Shahed drones that have been used on the Ukrainian front[21]. In return, Russia provides Iran with radar systems, combat aircraft, and air defense technologies[22]. In addition, Iran and Russia have started building a drone factory in Tatarstan, which is expected to produce 6,000 drones by 2025[23]. Not only the military sector, but also the industrial sector is the subject of intensive cooperation. China has increased its share of the Russian machinery and machine tool market from 13% in 2017 to 90% in 2023[24]. This dependency allows Russia to evade Western sanctions and keep military production high. Iran and Russia are also working on payment systems that bypass SWIFT, allowing them to trade in rubles and riyals[25]. Such mechanisms weaken the effectiveness of EU sanctions, increasing the economic self-sufficiency of these countries.
Sino-Iranian support for Russia.
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cooperation on the sharing of military and industrial technologies between Russia, China and Iran has become a key element of the Kremlin's survival strategy, which has come under Western sanctions. Iran provides Russia with drones, China supports the modernization of the Russian defense industry, and Moscow returns the favor by providing advanced military technologies to partners. As a result, the threat to both the stability of the region and European security is increasing[26]. China is the most important supplier of electronic components to the Russian defense industry. In 2023, 90% of the microelectronics imported by Russia came from China, which was crucial for the modernization of its armed forces[27]. China also supplies ball bearings, machine tools, and precision machinery, which are essential for the production of tanks and combat aircraft[28].In addition, Russia and China are developing cooperation in the production of combat drones. In the first half of 2023, Chinese companies provided Russia with drones worth $14.5 million. Although Beijing officially denies reports that it directly supports the Russian military, an analysis of import statistics indicates that military equipment arrives in Moscow through intermediary companies in Hong Kong[29]. Iran, in turn, plays a key role in supplying Russia with combat drones. Since 2022, Moscow has received at least 4600 Shahed-136 drones, which have been used to attack Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure[30]. In 2024, Iran has also supplied Russia with 400 Fateh-110 ballistic missiles, capable of striking targets at distances of up to 700 kilometers (approximately 435 miles).
In an effort to reduce dependence on external suppliers, Russia and Iran have jointly initiated the construction of a drone production facility in Tatarstan, with a projected output of 6,000 drones annually by 2025. These new industrial facilities are expected to enable Moscow to sustain its military operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to expand arms exports to other countries in the Middle East. Moscow, however, is not merely a beneficiary in this partnership; in exchange for drones and missiles, it provides Iran with advanced radar systems, combat aircraft, and sophisticated air defense technologies. Iran received Russian attack helicopters, radars and fighter planes, which significantly increased its defense capabilities[31]. In 2023, Iran assisted Russia in constructing a drone production facility in Yelabuga, located in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, with the aim of producing approximately 6,000 Shahed-136 drones by mid-2025. The facility is intended to ensure a continuous supply of drones for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to increase arms exports to other Middle Eastern countries[32]. Given Tehran's ambitions to become a dominant power in Central Asia, strengthening its military potential should not be underestimated. Iran views the region as a strategically vital sphere of influence. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Tehran considers much of Central Asia to be part of its "near abroad"—a space where it seeks to assert both cultural and strategic presence. This perspective drives Tehran's efforts to establish a stronger presence in the area[33]. Russia, in turn, shares its expertise in the modernization of drones and missile systems, enabling Iran to improve its indigenous technological capabilities. As a result, Tehran is not only reinforcing its own defense posture, but also expanding its ability to export modern weapons systems to partners such as Syria and the Yemeni Houthis. China also benefits from this trilateral exchange. It continues to gain access to advanced Russian military technologies, particularly in the areas of aircraft engines and missile systems. Notably, more than 40% of China’s current fighter jet fleet still relies on Russian engines[34]. While Beijing has taken steps to reduce this dependency, including efforts to develop its own advanced propulsion technologies, it remains unable to achieve full self-sufficiency in this sector[35].
The transfer of military technology between Russia, Iran and China poses a serious threat to the European Union. In 2023, Russia used Chinese components to modernize more than 200 tanks and produce modern fire control systems. This enhancement of Russia’s offensive capabilities risks escalating conflicts in Eastern Europe and further deteriorating the security situation in Ukraine. Iran, in turn, may utilize newly acquired technologies to threaten European maritime infrastructure in the Mediterranean and to advance its missile program—developments that raise significant concerns for both the EU and NATO. In January 2025, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted the "Prophet Muhammad" naval exercise in the Persian Gulf. The exercise featured the deployment of advanced combat drones such as the Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5, equipped with AI-enhanced Qaem and Almas missiles. These systems successfully destroyed simulated targets, demonstrating Iran’s growing capacity to integrate artificial intelligence and high-precision technologies into its military operations[36]. In March 2025, Iran participated in the "Security Belt-2025" joint naval exercises alongside Russia and China in the Gulf of Oman. The drills involved more than 20 warships and featured a series of coordinated operations, including simulated maritime attacks, joint search and rescue missions, and vessel inspection procedures. The primary objective was to enhance military interoperability among the three states and to signal their increasing coordination in strategic maritime zones[37]. Iran has also incorporated Russian-made long-range air defense systems, such as the S-300, into its own military exercises. In February 2025, these systems were deployed to intercept simulated hostile targets, demonstrating Iran’s growing capacity to integrate advanced foreign technologies into its national defense architecture[38].
The trilateral military-technical cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China—particularly in the field of weapons systems and joint exercises—carries significant implications for global and regional security. Such developments are particularly alarming in light of Iran’s provision of ballistic missiles to Russia and China’s continued supply of dual-use components that are critical to sustaining Russian defense production[39]. In this trilateral framework, China provides Russia with key electronic components, Iran supplies drones and ballistic missiles, and in return, Moscow shares advanced military technologies with both partners. This reciprocal exchange has significantly enhanced the military capabilities of all three countries. Moreover, their increasingly assertive defense and foreign policies pose a growing challenge to the stability and security of the European Union.
Espionage: Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China and Its Threats to the European Union
Intelligence cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China represents one of the most critical threats to the security of the European Union. This trilateral partnership has intensified efforts to spy on European governmental, academic, and corporate institutions. The scope of this cooperation encompasses a wide range of intelligence practices, from traditional methods such as agent recruitment and institutional infiltration to advanced cyber techniques, including data exfiltration and the manipulation of public opinion through social media platforms. Key mechanisms driving this partnership include the coordinated exchange of surveillance technologies, the execution of joint cyber operations, and mutual support in orchestrating large-scale disinformation campaigns. Collectively, these activities pose an escalating threat to the internal stability and strategic autonomy of the European Union and its member states. The European External Action Service (EEAS) identifies Russia and China as the principal foreign actors engaged in information manipulation that undermines both EU security and democratic governance. According to EEAS reports, such activities involve disinformation, information distortion, and deliberate interference in the EU’s information space[40]. A joint report by MERICS, Chatham House, and the German Marshall Fund analyzes the growing strategic alignment between China and Russia and its implications for European security. The report underscores the deepening cooperation in the fields of military technology, cybersecurity, and disinformation—areas that collectively pose a destabilizing risk to the European region[41]. Moreover, Russia, Iran, and China are engaged in regular intelligence exchange, which enhances their capacity to conduct coordinated operations against the European Union and NATO structures more effectively. Intelligence documents from 2023 reveal that Tehran and Moscow are conducting joint operations to infiltrate Western academic and research institutions[42]. In turn, the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) cooperates with the Russian FSB in analyzing the activities of European foreign policy think tanks[43].
Cyberspace has become a central domain of intelligence cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China[44]. In 2023, Chinese state-sponsored hackers conducted 104 cyberattacks targeting European government institutions and high-tech corporations[45]. In one of the largest attacks in 2022, Chinese cybercriminals broke into the systems of the EU's technology research agency, stealing data on artificial intelligence and cryptography[46]. Simultaneously, Russian hackers—often operating in coordination with Iranian cyber units—have conducted operations against European critical infrastructure. In a high-profile case, they infected power grid systems in several EU member states, causing regional disruptions. Analysts from Europol and NATO report that recent cyberattacks attributed to Russia, Iran, and China have not only disrupted critical economic sectors in the EU but have also exposed vulnerabilities in the Union’s defensive and response mechanisms—suggesting a potential intent to probe Europe’s cyber resilience[47]. According to Europol’s 2025 annual report, the European Union is facing an increase in politically motivated cyberattacks and sabotage, primarily driven by state actors such as Russia[48]. The report details how “hybrid threat” networks are increasingly collaborating with organized crime groups to destabilize the EU. These operations include sabotage, arson, cyber intrusions, data theft, migrant smuggling, and other forms of strategic criminal activity. EU and Polish officials have publicly cited examples of recent cyberattacks on hospitals and acts of arson linked to Russian military intelligence. The report further highlights the evolving nature of these threats, emphasizing the use of artificial intelligence in cybercrime and the recruitment of young people for online fraud schemes. Europol warns that such hybrid threats are designed to undermine democratic institutions, social cohesion, and the rule of law within the European Union[49]. In December 2024, NATO announced a series of new measures aimed at strengthening the protection of Europe’s critical infrastructure, following a wave of sabotage-related incidents, including data cable disruptions in Sweden, Finland, and other locations. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte identified Russia and China as potential sources of these threats and stressed the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and infrastructure defense across member states. As part of these efforts, a dedicated maritime exercise known as “Frozen Winds” was conducted, involving the use of underwater drones and minesweeper vessels to improve detection and monitoring capabilities in vulnerable maritime zones. These initiatives reflect NATO’s growing recognition of the strategic risks posed by state-sponsored cyber and hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing the region[50].
China and Russia have been conducting intelligence operations for years, the aim of which is to acquire modern technologies from Europe. Since 2000, 224 cases of Chinese espionage against Western scientific institutions and technology companies have been documented[51]. An example of such an operation was the infiltration of a German university of technology in 2021, where Chinese agents obtained data on modern materials for semiconductor production[52]. Iran, in turn, uses its intelligence networks to obtain knowledge from European technical universities. Between 2019 and 2023, Iranians conducted infiltration operations at least 10 universities in the EU, which allowed them to gain access to research on missile technologies[53]. Russia, Iran and China regularly recruit agents in Europe, using various methods of pressure. In 2022, a Russian spy network in EU institutions was discovered that had access to classified documents on sanctions imposed on Moscow[54]. China, in turn, infiltrates European technology corporations, recruiting employees to illegally transfer patents and industrial secrets. Between 2015 and 2021, more than 1200 cases of intellectual property theft were disclosed by European courts[55]. Russia, Iran and China are conducting coordinated disinformation operations aimed at weakening the unity of the European Union. In 2023, the European External Action Service (EEAS) documented over 750 incidents of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) within the European Union. These coordinated disinformation campaigns were designed to erode public trust in EU institutions, undermine support for sanctions against Russia, and destabilize the political landscape of member states[56]. In 2023, Russian influence operations reached more than 50 million users in Europe[57]. Iran focuses on anti-EU propaganda, especially in the context of Middle East policy. In 2022, Iranian state media conducted a disinformation campaign against EU sanctions imposed on Tehran[58]. In April 2025, the French government formally accused the Russian military intelligence agency, GRU, of orchestrating a series of cyberattacks between 2021 and 2024. These attacks targeted various French entities, including government ministries, local authorities, aerospace and financial sectors, and notably, an organization involved in organizing the 2024 Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games. The French cybersecurity agency, ANSSI, reported that these cyberattacks were carried out by the hacking group APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, which is linked to the GRU. The primary objective of these operations was intelligence gathering, particularly in the context of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine. The French Foreign Ministry specifically identified GRU Unit 20728 as responsible for these activities. France condemned these destabilizing actions and emphasized its commitment to collaborating with international partners to counter such malicious cyber behavior[59].
The intelligence cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China constitutes one of the most serious and multidimensional threats to the European Union. Their coordinated activities encompass cyberattacks, academic infiltration, agent recruitment, and large-scale disinformation campaigns targeting critical institutions and societal trust. In response, the European Union must significantly enhance its security posture by strengthening counterintelligence capabilities, investing in cybersecurity and data protection infrastructure, and adopting a more strategic approach to limiting foreign influence in key economic and political sectors.
The European Union’s Response to Trilateral Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China
Strategic Awareness of the Threat
The European Parliament report (A9-0164/2022) draws attention to the growing awareness of the threats posed by Russia, China, and Iran to the European Union’s security and democratic resilience[60]. However, the report also highlights a persistent gap between the recognition of specific risks and the acknowledgment of the broader strategic challenge arising from the trilateral cooperation among these actors. According to the document, Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the EU’s security outlook, leading to an unprecedented mobilization of military, economic, and diplomatic resources. The report identifies China’s economic and diplomatic support for Russia as a potential long-term threat to European security. Iran’s destabilizing role is also addressed, particularly in relation to arms transfers to Russia and state-sponsored cyber activities. Nevertheless, the European Union’s institutional response remains selective and, at times, fragmented. In response to China’s indirect support for Russia’s war effort, the EU has introduced targeted sanctions against Chinese entities involved in the provision of dual-use goods to Russia. These steps, while significant, have been implemented with caution—reflecting the Union’s broader strategic considerations and complex economic interdependence with China. Notably, in 2024, the EU proposed new sanctions on Chinese companies supplying sensitive technologies to Russia, marking a deliberate shift towards more assertive policy measures[61].
The European Union’s awareness of the threat posed by the trilateral cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China is reflected in its measures across five key areas: sanctions and countermeasures, military and intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity, diplomacy, and economic policy. However, given the EU’s strong identity as an economic bloc, addressing these security challenges often requires reconciling protective measures with entrenched business interests. Recent policy debates highlight the need for clearer legal frameworks and stronger enforcement mechanisms to ensure that security imperatives are not overridden by economic considerations—particularly in sensitive sectors such as energy, critical technologies, and infrastructure. Recognizing the growing challenge to its security and strategic autonomy, the EU has adopted a broad set of measures aimed at limiting the influence of these actors and reducing their ability to carry out aggressive operations. A central pillar of this strategy involves the imposition of economic and financial restrictions. These measures include asset freezes and travel bans targeting individuals and entities supporting Russian aggression, the disconnection of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, export bans on military and dual-use technologies, as well as trade restrictions in the energy, transport, and raw materials sectors[62]. In addition, the European Union is cooperating with global digital platforms to curb the spread of false or misleading content promoting Russo-Chinese narratives—particularly those that delegitimize EU’s support for Ukraine, portray Western sanctions as ineffective, and amplify anti-NATO sentiments. Since 2022, this cooperation has intensified in response to coordinated disinformation waves following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and amid China’s parallel efforts to frame the EU as economically dependent and geopolitically divided. This initiative complements broader disinformation countermeasures and reflects the EU’s commitment to safeguarding the integrity of its information environment[63].
The third pillar of the Union’s strategic response involves sanctions targeting Iranian entities responsible for arms transfers. These measures address Iran’s active support for Russia, including the delivery of combat drones and technological assistance to its defense sector. The EU has imposed restrictions on Iranian companies involved in the production and export of weapons and has banned the export of technologies that could reinforce Iran’s military capabilities[64]. In addition, the European Union has strengthened intelligence cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom to more effectively monitor and counter Iranian activities in the military and intelligence domains. This coordination focuses on three key priorities: deepening strategic ties with NATO, enhancing transatlantic intelligence sharing, and advancing the EU’s strategic autonomy in the field of defense. Within the broader framework of EU–NATO cooperation, particular emphasis has been placed on improving the coordination of military operations, including the development of rapid response capabilities among member states[65]. A third joint EU–NATO declaration is planned with the aim of strengthening the coherence and coordination of collective defense efforts across Europe[66]. In parallel, the European Union is working to enhance intelligence sharing between member states and EU institutions. Notably, recent reports emphasize the need to increase both the financial and technological capacities of EU-level intelligence structures. This is part of a broader effort to reinforce the Union’s strategic autonomy—understood as the ability to act independently in defense matters while maintaining strong partnerships with NATO and other allies. The importance of investing in the European defense industry and developing military capabilities based on domestic resources is also highlighted[67]. The European Union has also taken concrete steps to strengthen cybersecurity and counter hybrid threats, particularly in response to Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation and cyberattacks. As part of its efforts to combat disinformation, the EU is reinforcing the role of the East StratCom Task Force, which monitors and counters coordinated propaganda campaigns originating from Russia and China. For example, in 2024, the Task Force exposed multiple disinformation waves related to EU sanctions policy and vaccine safety, highlighting how false or manipulated content is used to amplify hostile narratives. The Task Force distinguishes between broader strategic narratives—such as framing the EU as weak or divided—and specific disinformation incidents that involve verifiably false claims designed to mislead or incite public distrust.[68]
To counter the manipulation of public opinion through social media and other dissemination tools, the EU is also developing strategic communication frameworks aimed at increasing societal resilience to external influence[69]. Established under the NIS 2 Directive, the European Cyber Crisis Liaison Organization Network (EU-CyCLONe) facilitates cooperation among national authorities responsible for cyber crisis management. The network is designed to ensure a coordinated and timely response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents across the European Union[70]. Recognizing the growing threat landscape, the EU has emphasized the need to further enhance its defense capabilities against cyberattacks. This includes the development of a systemic approach to early threat detection and response mechanisms, involving all member states in a unified framework[71]. In its foreign policy, the European Union also highlights the importance of reducing economic dependence on China—particularly in critical areas such as supply chains, advanced technologies, and access to rare earth elements. To address this, the EU is working to diversify sources of raw materials and strengthen its own industrial base. At the same time, it underscores the need to intensify cooperation with democratic partners to avoid strategic dependencies on authoritarian regimes. This multi-dimensional support for Ukraine is not only a response to Russia’s direct military aggression but also forms part of the EU’s broader strategy to counter the systemic threat posed by the trilateral alignment of Russia, Iran, and China, which jointly seek to undermine European security and stability. Parallel to these efforts, the EU has consistently provided support to Ukraine in the form of military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. This includes arms deliveries under the European Peace Facility (EPF), reflecting a broader commitment to regional security and stability. As part of a broader assistance package, the so-called "Team Europe"—comprising the European Union and its Member States—has mobilized a total of €143 billion in support of Ukraine. This amount includes macro-financial assistance, allocations from the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid, and military support delivered both through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and directly by individual Member States[72]. In the field of humanitarian assistance, the European Union has delivered over 154,000 tonnes of in-kind aid, including medical equipment, field hospitals, temporary shelters, school buses, ambulances, and nearly 8,900 power generators. This support has been coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with the participation of 35 countries[73].
Deficits in Threat Perception and Strategic Awareness
There are several areas in which the European Union has yet to fully recognize or respond to the long-term threat posed by the trilateral cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China. The first area of concern lies in the absence of a decisive EU response to China’s dual strategic role. Despite China’s consistent support for Russia—both economically and diplomatically—the EU remains reluctant to frame China as a systemic adversary. As a result, critical economic dependencies persist, particularly in the fields of advanced technology and strategic raw materials, while the Union lacks a long-term strategy to reduce these structural vulnerabilities. The second area relates to the EU’s limited response to Iranian hybrid tactics. While official documents acknowledge Iran’s activities in cyberspace, its military partnerships, and its provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, the corresponding EU countermeasures remain fragmented and insufficient. However, the most fundamental weakness is the lack of a unified recognition of the coordinated threat posed by the trilateral cooperation itself.Although the EU acknowledges interactions among Russia, Iran, and China, it continues to address them primarily in bilateral or isolated terms. Consequently, there is no comprehensive EU policy framework that accounts for the cumulative and systemic impact of their strategic alignment on European security.
Recommendations
To effectively address the complex and evolving threats posed by foreign interference—particularly from the People’s Republic of China—the European Union must adopt a coherent and forward-looking strategy. Such a strategy should integrate existing policy instruments, promote institutional alignment, and enhance coordination among Member States and EU bodies. The following recommendations outline concrete measures aimed at strengthening the Union’s resilience against disinformation, espionage, and other forms of hybrid interference.
First, the European Union should take active steps to counter foreign interference by implementing the recommendations and initiatives outlined in the various European Parliament resolutions concerning interference in democratic processes within the EU, including disinformation.
Second, the European Union should pursue a more coordinated and strategic approach to the protection of critical infrastructure at the EU level, particularly in response to growing risks associated with Chinese influence. This includes limiting external control, countering hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, surveillance of the Chinese diaspora, and espionage operations originating from and taking place within the EU. This approach must prioritize security considerations over purely economic interests and involve close cooperation with international partners to promote a global, open, stable, and secure cyberspace. To that end, the EU should increase resourcesallocated to both EU institutions and Member States for defending against cyberespionage conducted by the People’s Republic of China and formally call on China to cease such activities.
Furthermore, the EU should enhance cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners to reduce the risk of espionage and interference in critical infrastructure—particularly assets with military relevance. Finally, Key EU institutions—such as the European Commission and its executive agencies managing Horizon Europe and other research frameworks—should be urged to halt funding and collaboration with Chinese companies involved in sectors of critical and strategic importance, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and cybersecurity. Recent reviews have shown that several Chinese entities have participated in EU-funded projects despite growing security concerns.[74]
Finally, the European Union should ensure a unified and coherent approach to cultural and academic cooperation with China, with safeguards in place to prevent undue influence stemming from Chinese financial involvement. This includes investigating the current state of research cooperation between EU and Chinese institutions to ensure that such partnerships are not being exploited as channels of foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China.
While the EU should continue to monitor allegations that Confucius Institutes have been used to disseminate propaganda and restrict academic freedom, greater emphasis must be placed on addressing broader and more impactful channels of influence—such as state-sponsored partnerships with major research institutions, technology transfer through joint ventures, and covert operations involving Chinese enterprises embedded within critical infrastructure sectors.In addition, ongoing scrutiny should focus on how Chinese state-linked actors may exert indirect influence over research agendas, funding streams, and self-censorship practices within European higher education institutions—particularly in areas related to sensitive topics such as human rights and technological cooperation. Enhanced transparency around partnerships and funding sources remains crucial to safeguarding academic integrity.
Conclusion
The trilateral alignment of Russia, Iran, and China presents a multifaceted and evolving threat to the European Union’s security, stability, and strategic autonomy. While these actors pursue distinct national agendas, their overlapping interests—whether in the realm of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, military cooperation, or economic leverage—create a cumulative destabilizing effect. Russia remains the primary source of direct military aggression and tactical cyberattacks; Iran reinforces destabilization through proxy networks and ideological amplification; and China plays a critical role by facilitating technological advancement, strategic infiltration, and economic entanglement.
The European Union’s response has developed across several dimensions: reinforcing cybersecurity and counterintelligence, strengthening its cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners, rethinking its approach to foreign influence in critical sectors, and supporting Ukraine as a frontline of defense against systemic aggression. However, gaps remain—notably in balancing economic interests with security imperatives, ensuring resilience against sophisticated hybrid tactics, and maintaining unity among Member States in the face of complex external pressures.
Going forward, the EU must continue to sharpen its threat perception, streamline its policy instruments, and foster a culture of strategic foresight. Only a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, acknowledging the distinct yet complementary roles of Russia, Iran, and China, can safeguard Europe’s democratic institutions, technological sovereignty, and geopolitical stability.
 |
Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. |
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