Key Takeaways
- Beijing sees Moscow as its long-term strategic partner to reshape the international order, therefore has no serious intention to contradict Moscow’s interests in Ukraine. In spite of the contradictions with Beijing’s insistence on territorial sovereignty as a key principle of the international order, Beijing has provided vital economic and diplomatic support to Moscow to wage its war against Ukraine.
- Ending the war in Ukraine is not a priority for Beijing and will not act against Moscow’s interests to achieve this.
- The Ukraine war is mainly utilized by Beijing in multilateral forums to criticize the US-led “liberal international order” and present its own approaches to global governance, especially its “Global Security Initiative”, as a more viable alternative to preserve global peace.
- Despite scepticism in the West and among its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, China’s narratives about the war have found a more receptive audience among Global South elites, as seen in joint declarations between Beijing and various Global South governments regarding the war.
- China’s approach to the Ukraine war indicates that the willingness to improve relations with Europe is not prioritised at the expense of keeping Moscow onside. This remains true despite the major changes brought by US President Donald Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy.
Introduction - Beijing's vision of a new global security
order
Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 happened at a time when Beijing had
already been working on promoting its newest vision of a future global order
via a series of “Global Initiatives”. The “Global Development Initiative”, put
forward by Xi Jinping in 2021, was the first instalment of this tripartite
series. The “Global Security Initiative” (GSI) was put forward by Xi Jinping at
the annual Bo’ao Forum in April 2022, ca. two months after Russia launched the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In
2023, this was also followed by the so-called “Global Civilisation Initiative”
put forward by Xi Jinping.
While Xi Jinping did not mention the Ukraine war in his keynote
speech at the Bo’ao Forum 2022, where the Global Security Initiative was
announced, it was already referenced in some early key documents under the
names “Ukraine crisis” (乌克兰危机）and “Ukraine issue”
(乌克兰问题). Such documents
include an article by Foreign
Minister Wang Yi published in the People’s
Daily a few days after Xi’s keynote speech at Bo’ao 2022. A
longer elaboration of the Global Security Initiative is found in a so-called
“concept paper” (概念文件) published by the government-owned Xinhua News Agency in February
2023.
The Global Security Initiative set the main guidelines for China’s approach
to the Ukraine war in the subsequent years. The main principles, such as the
dual emphasis on upholding the principles of territorial sovereignty as found
in the U.N. Charter, while at the same time calling for the respect of
“legitimate security concerns” (合理安全关切) of other states, were laid down in the speeches and documents
related to the Initiative. In 2024, a major progress report on the implementation of the GSI was published by
the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and other state-affiliated
think tanks, praising the supposed successes of the GSI. Here, the two
principles are also mentioned side-by-side.
Beijing’s approach to
Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty thus represents a major contradiction in the
Chinese government’s self-framing as respecting and upholding the UN Charter on
territorial sovereignty. Beijing regularly promotes itself as a defender of
sovereignty in the UN. The Chinese leadership is especially vocal about the principle of territorial
sovereignty when it comes to defending its territorial claims over Taiwan. An overview of China’s UN voting patterns by the Germany-based Mercator
Institute for China Studies (MERICS) indicates that to some extent, Beijing
distanced itself from Moscow in UN votes in recent years.
Yet, Beijing’s lack of willingness to put any significant diplomatic and
economic pressure on Moscow regarding Ukraine, its refusal to publicly criticise
Moscow for launching the full-scale war, indicate that realpolitik still
tops principle-based considerations among China’s leadership.
Position papers and statements on the war
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022, Beijing has issued several key documents introducing its
position on the Ukraine war. One of the early documents was the so-called “Four
Shoulds”
(四个应该) published in March
2022. The document emphasized the broad principles of respecting territorial
integrity, upholding the UN Charter, respecting the “legitimate security
concerns” of other parties, and supporting all efforts leading to peace.
In February 2023,
Beijing released a “12-point position paper” on resolving what
is officially called the “Ukraine crisis” (乌克兰危机) in official Chinese sources. The
document can be seen as a further elaboration on the principles emphasised by
Beijing in the earlier “Four Shoulds”. Some of the points include generally
agreed-upon principles such as the avoidance of using nuclear weapons in the
conflict and the avoidance of targeting nuclear facilities as part of the
conflict. Others are more specific to the advancement of Beijing’s own
geopolitical agenda, such as the points emphasizing the “abandoning of Cold War
mentality [and of military “bloc formation”]” and “stopping unilateral
sanctions”. The document does not represent a “peace plan” as it avoids
outlining any concrete steps leading to the end of hostilities.
The subsequent issuing of a “Four Principles”
statement by Beijing following Xi Jinping’s meeting with German Chancellor Olaf
Scholz in April 2024 included the security of trade routes and supply chains as
one of the four principles. The
so-called “Six-Point Consensus” jointly issued by the Brazilian and Chinese
governments in May 2024 reiterated largely the same positions as the earlier
documents. It was nevertheless seen as an important step for Beijing to get the
official support of a major Global South nation and BRICS member state.
Meanwhile, in September 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy rejected
the six-point statement at a speech given at the UN, criticizing it for its
pro-Kremlin biases.
Beijing’s “Peace Diplomacy”
Apart from the
position papers and official statements, since 2023, Beijing has dispatched its
“Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs,” Li Hui, four times to visit
Russia, Ukraine, and a number of European and other states to advance
negotiations on ending the Ukraine war. The first two missions of Li Hui
involved negotiations in Kyiv, Moscow, Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw.
Li’s diplomatic missions were met with a high degree of scepticism among
analysts in EU countries. His perceived close ties to Moscow, incl. his
10-year-long appointment as PRC ambassador in Moscow, were highlighted in this
context. Other than that, the “window-dressing” nature of the engagements with
little substantial efforts to bring an end to the conflict was also highlighted
by various observers.
It is telling in this
context that the last two trips of Li Hui did not involve Ukraine, Russia, and
European nations but Global South nations instead. Beijing’s intention to push
for peace in Ukraine is questionable in light of this, while its intention to capitalise
on the war to build its image as a “responsible stakeholder” in the Global
South seems to be an important factor. Global South leaders who subscribed to
Beijing’s narratives likely had economic motivations as well, such as the
concern about growing wheat prices as a result of the war. Li Hui’s visits to Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Brazil, South Africa,
and Indonesia involved further statements on the importance of finding a
negotiated solution to the war and voiced concerns about its global spillover
effects.
While doing little in terms of achieving peace in Ukraine, Beijing thus scored
diplomatic gains among Global South elites via Li Hui’s shuttle diplomacy. This
was also demonstrated by the subsequent setting up of a “Friends for Peace”
group in the UN involving 17 Global South countries, co-chaired by Chinese FM
Wang Yi and his Brazilian counterpart Mauro Vieira.
Lack of economic and diplomatic pressure on Moscow
From the EU’s point of
view, China’s approach to the Ukraine war should be evaluated not only based on
what the Beijing government did but also based on what it did not do. Beijing
never issued a clear condemnation of Moscow for the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, and increased its economic interaction with Russia in the subsequent
years. In 2024, China-Russia trade hit a record high, based on Chinese customs
data. Meanwhile,
in Chinese government sources, the bilateral relations between the two
countries were regularly described as “maintaining normal ties”
with Moscow, and as “not targeting / not affected by any third party”.
Since Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the storm of Western sanctions on Russia,
China has also proved crucial to Russia’s wartime economy by providing a large
amount of civilian-military dual-use goods. Based on data from the General
Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China (GACC) analysed by
MERICS, the main dual-used goods exported to Russia by China include “general
computing and telecommunications hardware”, “advanced electronic and
communication components”, and “semiconductor and electronics manufacturing and
testing components”. The definitions of “dual-use goods” here are
based on the Common High
Priority Items (CHPI) List, a
collaborative effort developed by the United States, the European Union, the United
Kingdom, and Japan.
By exporting large
amounts of dual-use goods, Beijing aims to support Moscow’s war efforts in
Ukraine while at the same time not crossing the red line of being a direct
military supporter of Moscow. Becoming a direct military supporter of Moscow
would likely provoke a major sanctions war between Beijing and the West and its
allies in East Asia. Unlike North Korea and Iran, countries that have been
under Western sanctions for decades, Beijing apparently sees too much economic
risk in this scenario. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 2024, an increasing number
of intelligence sources indicated that Russia is producing some of its military
drones in a Chinese factory.
The Chinese and
Russian governments’ bilateral exchanges reached an especially high level since
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin and Xi met or spoke via phone ten
times between February 2022 and February 2025, and their foreign ministers met
or spoke via phone almost on a monthly basis in the same time period. This is
more than with any other foreign counterpart, for both countries. At the same time, exchanges between Beijing and the Ukrainian leadership were
by far more limited. Xi has had one phone conversation with Zelenskiy since the
outbreak of the full-scale war. The only in-person high-level meeting of a
Ukrainian foreign minister with their Chinese counterpart was during former FM
Dmytro Kuleba’ meeting with Wang Yi in July 2024. During his trip to China,
Kuleba was not received in Beijing but in Guangzhou instead, after visiting
Hong Kong as part of his trip. Kuleba and Wang had some further in-person meetings at the sidelines of
multilateral events, such as the Munich Security Conference 2024.
Apart from the
economic support, indirect military support, and the high frequency of
top-level bilateral exchanges between Moscow by Beijing, the Chinese leadership
has also actively supported Moscow in multilateral forums. Moscow thus managed to
maintain a high visibility among non-Western nations via Chinese-initiated
multilateral institutions such as the BRICS+
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The most prominent recent multilateral forum was the 2024 BRICS Summit held in
Kazan, Russia, also attended by Indian PM Narendra Modi and other top leaders
from various member states. The summit highlighted the lack of Moscow’s
isolation from Global South countries and the major role played by
Chinese-initiated institutions in this regard.
This was further
demonstrated by Xi Jinping being Putin’s guest of honour at the 80th
Victory Day parade in Moscow. Brazilian President Lula da Silva and more than
20 other world leaders were also received by Putin during the Victory Day
festivities, with Slovakia’s PM Robert Fico being the only EU leader among Putin’s
guests.
Latest trends since Donald Trump’s return to power
Since Donald Trump’s
return to power and his push for a quick end to the Ukraine war, the actions
and statements of the Trump administration on the issue have dominated much of
the international media attention. Beijing’s actions are currently receiving little
attention, and the Chinese leadership has been mostly in a reactive mode on the
issue. Chinese government officials, including FM Wang Yi have made some
statements calling for Europe’s participation in the Ukraine peace process.
Meanwhile, Beijing’s decision to appoint Lu Shaye, a controversial “wolf
warrior” diplomat who earlier called into question the sovereignty of Central
Asia’s post-Soviet states, as the new Special Representative for European
Affairs sends an arguably less friendly message to Brussels.
Lu also made some comments aimed at highlighting transatlantic divisions,
calling Washington’s treatment of its allies “appalling” while at the same time
reiterating the call for Europe’s participation in Ukraine’s peace
negotiations.
Beijing's main
priority, however, remains keeping Moscow as a close ally and avoiding a
“reverse Kissinger” scenario, where the U.S. aligns with Russia to counter
China.
While many analysts see this analogy as flawed ,
the comparison to the 1970s U.S.-China rapprochement against the Soviet Union
is widely discussed now and seems to worry China’s leadership as well. Xi
Jinping’s phone call to Vladimir Putin on the third anniversary of Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine indicates that Beijing wants to make sure Moscow
will not leave its orbit. On the same day as the leaders of several Western
countries (not including the US) were in Kyiv to mark the third anniversary of
the war, China’s top leader used the occasion to reaffirm the strong ties
between Beijing and Moscow. While commending dialogue between Washington and
Moscow, as well as the positive steps towards peace in Ukraine, the readout by
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the phone call also emphasized that
China and Russia “cannot be moved apart”.
Conclusion - What to Expect?
The Chinese
government’s approach to the Ukraine war is part of Beijing’s long-term
strategy to curb what is seen as the “global hegemony” of the United States and
build an alternative global order more suitable to Beijing’s worldviews and
interests. The partnership with Moscow plays an important role in this, and the
Ukraine war is seen mainly from this perspective in Beijing.
Achieving peace in
Ukraine is not a priority for Beijing, and the war is mainly referenced on
multilateral forums by Beijing to popularise its own approach to global
security. This approach, which in recent years has been summarised in the
“Global Security Initiative”, promotes the idea that US hegemonism and NATO
expansion are at the core of global conflicts, while Beijing offers a better
alternative for global peace and prosperity. Despite scepticism in the West and
among its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing’s world-making efforts
have had more success in the Global South, as also seen from joint statements
issued on the Ukraine war by China and the governments of various Global South
countries.
The recent trends
since Donald Trump’s return to power indicate that Beijing also has an interest
in utilising transatlantic divisions for its own benefit. Meanwhile, the main
priority of the Chinese leadership remains to preserve its close ties with
Moscow. Maintaining dialogue with Beijing and emphasising the EU’s position
about the Ukraine war is important, but Europe should not be naive about
Beijing putting any major effort into bringing a just end to the war. Beijing
will likely continue to provide crucial economic and diplomatic support to
Russia, while it will not take decisive steps towards ending the Ukraine war in
any way that seriously contradicts Moscow’s interests.
|
Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
|
[1] “Xi Proposes Global Security Initiative”, (National Committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, 21 April 2022; http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2022-04/21/c_745515.htm; last accessed on 27 March 2025).
