Key takeaways
- China’s
Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy is a multi-purpose tool to enhance
national power, accelerate technological innovation, and drive industrial and
economic development.
- MCF
has reshaped China’s space sector, driving rapid innovation and fostering the rise
of private commercial space actors aligned with national security and
industrial goals.
- Europe
has already been outpaced by both China and the U.S. in key space capabilities,
weakening its defense posture and reducing its strategic influence in a domain
that is increasingly shaping the broader geopolitical balance.
- Without
credible capabilities, the EU risks being sidelined from setting the rules and
standards in the space domain, limiting its ability to defend strategic
interests and values.
- Dependence
on U.S. space providers challenges the EU’s strategic autonomy, undermining secure,
independent access to space, at a time of growing uncertainty over the future
of the transatlantic security alliance.
- Drawing
lessons from China’s model, the EU must accelerate innovation and better mobilize
its private space sector to secure a competitive and autonomous position the
global space race.
Introduction:
Understanding China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy
In 2015, President Xi Jinping
elevated Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) to a national-level policy, transforming
it from a narrow, compartmentalized effort into an in-depth, system-wide
strategy at the center of China’s national development agenda.
While the idea of drawing on
civilian technology for military purposes - and vice-versa – is not new, Xi’s
vision for MCF has sought to go further, aligning national
defense capabilities with broader economic and social development,
technological, and security objectives.[1] On
the one hand, this entails a strategic push to “coordinate economic
construction and national defense construction,”[2]with
both serving as interdependent and mutually reinforcing engines of national
power. On the other hand, MCF supports the broader goal of building a
“techno-security state”, positioning cutting-edge technology as central to
China’s military strength, strategic advantage and global influence. Within
this approach, MCF is positioned as a key instrument to transform the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class, high-tech force able to operate in
informatized conflict environments.[3][4]
Under the direction of the Central
Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development (CCIMCD), Xi’s MCF
strategy has sought to effectively break down institutional barriers between
civilian and military sectors; leverage civilian innovation for military
modernization; accelerate dual-use and multi-use technology in critical
emerging fields and encourage private sector participation in defense-related
R&D.As such, MCF goes
well beyond the traditional notion of “dual-use”. It deliberately blurs the lines
between military, civilian and commercial domains, creating an integrated ecosystem
designed to advance China’s goals on multiple fronts: strengthening military
capabilities, driving technological self-reliance[5], fueling economic growth, and expanding
China’s global influence.
The space domain has become a key
area where this fusion strategy plays out. Through MCF, China is harnessing
commercial innovation to expand its space capabilities, with private companies
now playing a pivotal role in developing dual-use technologies that advance
national security interests.
These shifts carry important
implications for the European Union (EU), raising urgent questions about
strategic autonomy, technological resilience, and Europe’s ability to shape the
norms and power dynamics of the evolving space domain.
China’s
MCF in the Space Domain: Shifting From State-led to Commercially Driven
China’s
leadership views space as an increasingly decisive domain for national security
and a key emerging arena for strategic competition.[6] Leadership
in space is considered critical not only to achieving operational superiority,
but also to adapting military power to the demands of informatized warfare and
reinforcing strategic deterrence. Science and technological innovation in the
space and aerospace sectors have thus become integral to the country’s MCF
efforts.[7]
Traditionally,
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs), notably China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation (CASC)[8],
China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC)[9]
have formed thebackbone of China’s space sector. The space ecosystem also integrates
key government agencies, including the China National Space Administration
(CNSA)[10]
and the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defense (SASTIND).[11]
Academic institutions such as the Harbin Institute of Technology[12]
and Beihang University[13]
have similarly become major research hubs, contributing to advancements across
fields ranging from satellite design to space-based weapons systems.[14]
In line with the broader goals of the MCF strategy, major SOEs and their
subsidiaries tend to operate at the intersection of civilian and military
development.[15]
For instance, CASC functions under the direction of State-owned Asset
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC)[16]
but also maintains close operational ties to the Central military Commission
(CMC)[17]
through the Equipment Development Department. This ecosystem has enabled the
development of critical space infrastructure and technologies that are designed
for multiple overlapping applications across military, commercial and civilian
domains.
Among
these, satellites stand out as the most vital space assets, enabling secure
communications, intelligence gathering and precision targeting – capabilities that
have become essential in modern warfare. Notably, a critical pillar of China’s satellite
infrastructure is the Beidou Navigation System (BDS) – a global satellite-based
network used for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services. Illustrating
the MCF strategy, Beidou - primarily developed by CASC and its subsidiary
Chinese Academy of Science and Technology (CAST) - serves a broad range of
civilian applications including precision agriculture, smart cities and
intelligent transportation. Yet, it also plays a central role in China’s
military modernization efforts under the MCF strategy, enabling enhanced joint
combat, battlefield intelligence and weapon precision strike capabilities
through improved positioning and time synchronization.[18]
Starting in 2027, China plans to deploy an upgraded generation of Beidou
satellites, offering enhanced real-time positioning and timing services. This
improved system is expected to strengthen civilian applications while
significantly boosting the PLA’s ability to conduct precision strikes, unmanned
operations, and networked joint missions.[19]
Beidou’s growing sophistication and global reach could gradually challenge U.S.
dominance in satellite navigation by offering an alternative to the GPS system.
Recognizing
that space-based intelligence and information dominance are critical enablers
for modern warfare, China has also prioritized the development of
high-resolution remote sensing satellites in its MCF strategy.[20]
Remote sensing refers to using satellites equipped with cameras and sensors to
collect images and data about the Earth’s surface from orbit, without needing
physical contact or observation on the ground. These systems are a core source
of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), which support the detection, mapping and
monitoring of terrain, infrastructure and military activity. China’s Yaogan and
Gaofen remote sensing satellites use advanced imaging technologies (Synthetic
Aperture Radar), enabling detailed observation including at night and through
cloud or smoke. Their high resolution allows for the identification of objects
as small as military vehicles or equipment, giving China a powerful tool for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). For instance,
Gaofen-4&7 satellites can provide real-time, high-resolution images
enabling the military to monitor foreign military bases, track troop and
vehicle movements, follow naval vessels, detect missile sites, and map critical
infrastructure.[21]
The Yaogan-30 satellite cluster complements these capabilities by collecting
electronic and signal intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT), [22]
helping to locate radar systems, communication networks, and other electronic
military signals.[23][24]
Furthermore,
the ability to repair, refuel or reposition satellites in orbit (in-orbit
servicing) as well as to manoeuver satellites into close proximity with others (rendezvous
and proximity operations) is becoming essential for ensuring the resilience of
critical space infrastructure and maintaining operational continuity in a
conflict. China has been actively developing these capabilities, particularly
through its Shijian satellites series. The Shijian-21 satellite demonstrated
the ability to dock with and relocate another satellite using a robotic arm - moving
a defunct satellite to a graveyard orbit.[25][26] Although
part of a debris removal operation, concerns have been raised about the
potential counterspace implications of such capabilities to disrupt or disable
adversary satellites in a conflict scenario.[27]
The
effectiveness of satellites depends on the ability to launch and sustain them
into orbit. Launch capabilities are therefore critical to maintaining space
superiority, enabling the deployment, replacement, and long-term sustainment of
space infrastructure. China has focused on developing robust launch systems and
vehicles.[28]
The Long March rocket series forms the core of its state-developed launch
capabilities, supporting a wide range of missions from the deployment of
civilian space infrastructure to the launch of military payloads.[29]
Despite
notable progress, China has early on recognized that state-led capabilities
alone were insufficient to meet the scale, speed and cost-efficiency required
to compete in today’s space environment. Building and expanding space infrastructure
– particularly large-scale satellite constellations – is both financially demanding
and technically complex. These challenges have driven China to increasingly
leverage private sector participation and commercial innovation to accelerate breakthroughs
in space technology and reduce costs. Following Beijing’s 2014 decision to open
the industry to private capital[30],
the MCF strategy played a critical role in fostering the rise of private
commercial space actors, aligning their growth with national industrial and
security priorities.[31]
The
success of U.S. firms, particularly SpaceX, further accelerated this paradigm
shift, reinforcing China's efforts to integrate private space development with
national security objectives. The company’s breakthroughs in rocket recycling
technology, heavy lift launch vehicles and low Earth orbit (LEO) broadband satellite
constellation, notably, have served as a benchmark in the industry.[32]
The role of Starlink in the Ukraine War has shed light on the rising strategic
value of LEO constellations in modern conflict, particularly in securing
communications, supporting unmanned operations, and ensuring information
resilience against cyber and electronic warfare threats.[33]
Building
on these developments, China has increasingly focused on the deployment of its
own LEO constellations. The “Guowang” project - planned to include 13,000
satellites - represents the state-led component, while the private sector is
advancing parallel efforts through initiatives such as GalaxySpace’s Qianfan
(Spacesail) mega-constellation. It has set ambitious targets including the
launch of 648 satellites in 2025, global coverage by 2027, and the deployment
of 15,000 satellites by 2030.[34]
The expansion of such constellations has intensified competition over finite
space resources critical to satellite communications, particularly orbital
slots and radio-frequency spectrum.[35]
Beyond
broadband communication, China’s private sector is also advancing its Earth
Observation (EO) capabilities. For instance, Chang Guang Satellite Technology
(CGST) has developed the Jilin-1, currently the world’s largest commercial
sub-meter EO constellation. CGST plans to network 300 satellites by 2027,
significantly enhancing China's capacity for persistent surveillance, dynamic
target tracking, and real-time ISR operations. [36]
The constellation’s strategic relevance was already demonstrated in 2016, when
Jilin-1 satellites captured high-definition images of U.S. naval vessels at the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.[37]
Another
key area of focus for private companies is the development cost-effective
and/or reusable launch vehicles[38]-
a critical capability to strengthen strategic leverage by reducing launch
costs, increasing operational flexibility and enabling a rapid reconstitution
of space assets in a conflict scenario.[39]
Space X has set the standard for reusability in 2017, when it successfully
launched and landed a previously flown Falcon 9 booster, marking the first
reuse of an orbital-class rocket. [40]
This has allowed the company to significantly reduce costs compared to
traditional expendable systems and achieve a higher launch frequency. For
instance, Falcon 9 launches are priced at around USD 62 million, whereas
traditional expendable rockets such as the Atlas V or Europe’s newly introduced
Ariane 6 are estimated at approximately USD 150-200 million and EUR 75-115
million respectively.[41]
In 2024, SpaceX also achieved a record-breaking 133 successful orbital launches
using the Falcon series, against 20 for other U.S. space actors and only 2 for
European firms.[42] Besides developing medium-lift vehicles,
which offer more flexible use and faster deployment, Space X is also investing in
super-heavy launch vehicles critical to build satellite constellations. Its
Starship rocket[43]
- still under development- aims to be fully reusable and capable of carrying
over 100 tons to LEO - which would represent a game-changing increase compared
to traditional rockets.
Although
China’s private sector still lags behind the U.S. in launch reusability,
operational speed and heavy-lift capabilities, it is advancing at a fast pace
to emulate Space X’s model. Galactic Energy has demonstrated consistent launch
performance with its Ceres-1[44]and
is now developing a reusable medium-lift rocket (Pallas-1).[45]
Space Pioneer is developing a partially reusable medium-to-heavy lift rocket
targeting a 17-ton payload to LEO (Tianlong-3).[46] Meanwhile,
LandSpace became the first company to orbit a methane-fueled rocket in 2023
(Zhuque-2)[47]
and is now developing a fully reusable heavy-lift vehicle (Zhuque-3) to support
rapid constellation deployments.[48]
With this momentum expected to grow further - driven by strong state policy
support and financial incentives[49],
China’s private space sector is likely to significantly lower its cost of
access to orbit, speed up satellite deployments, and strengthen the resilience
of its space infrastructure - with important implications for the future
balance of power projection in space.
Figure: Overview of China’s Space
Capabilities
Strategic Implications for Europe
China’s rapid advances in the space domain and its
efforts to catch up with the United States carry important implications for
Europe’s future space power and strategic autonomy. While
the U.S. is likely to retain overall leadership in the near term, China’s
accelerating progress - particularly in launch services, satellite
constellations, and operational tempo - is steadily narrowing the gap and
reshaping the competitive landscape.[50]
In
contrast, Europe’s capabilities are increasingly falling behind both China and
the United States, raising concerns about its ability to maintain autonomous
access to space and safeguard critical space-based infrastructure. This is due
in part to structural limitations. The European space sector remains fragmented
across national and institutional lines, underfunded relative to its ambitions
and lacking private sector involvement.
Without
significant investment and innovation, Europe risks deepening its strategic
dependence at a time when space capabilities are becoming central to defense,
crisis management, and technological sovereignty.
Control
of space assets - including communications, intelligence, surveillance, and
positioning systems - will be critical for future warfare. Space superiority
will directly impact operational effectiveness, resilience in conflict
scenarios, and the ability to sustain independent decision-making. A continued erosion of Europe’s space capabilities would
not only weaken its defense posture but also reduce its strategic influence in
a domain that is increasingly shaping the broader geopolitical balance.
As
technological competition intensifies, leadership in space will also determine
who sets the norms, standards, and rules that govern future activities in this
domain. Without credible space capabilities, Europe risks being sidelined from
these critical discussions, limiting its ability to shape an international
order aligned with its interests and values. Meanwhile, China has been
expanding space cooperation with countries in Africa and Latin America through
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), strengthening its geopolitical influence
and role in shaping global space governance.
Besides these considerations,
China’s rise in space highlights the urgent need for Europe to boost its space
capabilities and technologies to secure strategic autonomy. The conflict in
Ukraine has demonstrated that space assets - particularly satellite
communications, intelligence, and surveillance are critical for modern warfare
and national resilience. Notably, satellite communications were among the first
targets in the early stages of the war.[51] EU
Defence and Space Commissioner,Andrius Kubilius, emphasized the importance of securing Europe’s
autonomy in space, warning that “In times of crisis, we cannot afford to be too
dependent on countries or companies from outside the EU.” His advocacy around
the “White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030” reflect the growing
integration of space into the EU’s common defense agenda.
Russia’s
increased efforts to coordinate with China in the space domain adds to Europe’s
strategic concerns. While cooperation on satellite navigation predates the war,
Western sanctions on Russia’s aerospace sector have made such partnerships more
strategically relevant. In 2022, the two countries agreed to construct a
Chinese ground station in Russia’s Obninsk as part of broader efforts to align
the Beidou and GLONASS navigation systems.[52]
This could enhance Russia’s operational resilience in conflict scenarios and
complicate efforts to disrupt its space-enabled military capabilities.[53]
There
have been recent efforts to boost EU space resilience, including the notable announcement
of the IRIS² multi-orbital satellite constellation involving around 290
satellites in December 2024. The deployment is set to start in 2029 with up to
13 Ariane 6 launches, while services provision is scheduled to start in 2030.[54]
Yet Europe’s ability to deliver on
these ambitions faces real risks. Persistent delays in the Ariane 6 program and
the grounding of Vega-C have exposed critical gaps in Europe’s launch
capabilities. [55] Europe currently operates only
expendable launchers and lacks a reusable system, putting it at a disadvantage. [56]This has already
forced the bloc to turn to non-European providers, including a €180 million
agreement with SpaceX to launch four Galileo satellites - an arrangement that
will expire in 2027.[57]
Without credible launch options, Europe risks deepening its reliance on U.S.
capabilities for access to space, with direct consequences for the continuity
of essential programs like Galileo and the timely deployment of IRIS².
Initiatives like MaiaSpace’s
partially reusable launcher[58], ESA’s Themis program, Space
Rider, and the CALLISTO demonstrator are important first steps. Yet, bridging
the strategic gap will require not only technological progress but also
sustained political will and accelerated investment. As China’s rapid development
of a competitive commercial launch sector showed, mobilizing a broader, more
dynamic private sector will be crucial for Europe to build the resilient,
independent space access it needs. This also calls for more integrated EU-level
approaches, including common procurement policies and harmonized priorities
among Member States to enhance the coherence, scale and competitiveness of the
EU’s space sector.
|
Category
|
Usage
|
State-Led Projects
|
Commercial / Private Projects
|
Why It Matters for Europeans?
|
|
SATELLITES
|
|
|
Earth Observation
Satellites (EO)
|
Satellites that
take pictures/videos of Earth for monitoring military, environment,
disasters, agriculture.
|
Gaofen satellites
(CAST)
|
Chang Guang
(Jilin-1), Genesat, MinoSpace, ADA Space
|
Expands China’s
global surveillance
- Europe faces ISR
and commercial EO competition (e.g., vs. Copernicus).
|
|
Communications / IoT
Satellites
|
Satellites providing internet,
mobile, or IoT connections across wide areas.
|
Zhongxing (ChinaSat), Tiantong
mobile systems
|
GalaxySpace (Qianfan LEO), Commsat,
MinoSpace, ADA Space
|
Strengthens China’s communications
resilience
- Challenges Europe in broadband/IoT markets; raises
dual-use risks.
|
|
Navigation / Positioning Satellite Systems
|
Satellite systems
like GPS, used for precise location, timing, and guidance.
|
BeiDou global
system (CAST, CASIC, CETC)
|
X
|
Gives China
military and civilian navigation independence
- Europe must secure
Galileo’s global role
|
|
Space Environment (SSA)
Satellites
|
Satellites tracking space weather,
radiation, and debris to protect other satellites.
|
Space debris/weather
monitoring (SOEs)
|
Emposat
|
Improves China’s space awareness,
protecting its assets
- Europe needs strong SSA to safeguard orbits and monitor
Chinese activities.
|
|
On-orbit Services / Operations
|
Systems that can
repair, refuel, upgrade, or deorbit satellites while in space.
|
Early R&D by
CASC, CAST
|
Few private
players yet, but emerging startups
|
Enables longer
satellite life, flexible military operations
- Europe needs to
monitor dual-use potential and develop its own capabilities for resilience.
|
|
Launch Vehicles
|
|
|
Small/Medium Launchers
|
Rockets that
launch small or medium satellites; fast, flexible access to space.
|
Long March 6/11
(CASC), Kuaizhou (CASIC)
|
Space Pioneer
(Tianlong-2), Galactic Energy (Ceres-1), i-Space, Ming Kong
|
Boosts China’s
ability to quickly launch/replace satellites
- Europe must
improve fast-launch capacity for resilience and military readiness.
|
|
Reusable Launchers
|
Rockets designed to land and be
reused, lowering costs and increasing launch speed.
|
Early research at CASC
|
Galactic Energy (Pallas-1), i-Space
(Hyperbola-2), Deep Blue Aerospace (Nebula-1)
|
Cuts China’s costs, increases
operational speed
- Europe needs investment in reusability to stay
competitive and secure flexible space access.
|
|
Heavy-Lift / Advanced Fuels
|
Large rockets that
carry heavy payloads or use cutting-edge fuels like methane.
|
Long March 5/7/9
(CASC)
|
LandSpace (Zhuque-2,
methane), Orienspace (Gravity-1 heavy-lift)
|
Supports strategic
payloads, lunar and military missions
- Europe needs
Ariane upgrades and/or joint heavy-lift programs to match capabilities.
|
Table: Main Chinese Space Assets and Strategic
Relevance for European Competitiveness in Space
|
Funded
by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of
the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European
Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European
Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. |
[16] See, “State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council,” (SASAC; https://en.sasac.gov.cn/ ; last accessed on 8 April 2025).
