Key takeaways
- In
August 2023, it was announced that the BRICS cooperation platform had accepted
six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates. So far, four of these nations have joined original members
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Argentina withdrew its
application in December while Saudi Arabia is still considering the offer).
- The
expansion of BRICS appears to have been instigated by China and Russia.
- With
this move, it has become clear that BRICS+ is a direct challenge to the G-7,
based on cooperation between global South countries and under Sino-Russian
leadership, since it clearly seeks to counter the “liberal international order”
(LIO) set up by the world’s wealthiest and most powerful countries.
- BRICS+
appears to be, from Beijing’s point of view, part of efforts to build a
“community of shared destiny/future” based on South-South cooperation and the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
- However,
cooperation between BRICS nations seems to be based more on united opposition
to the hegemony of the global North rather than a clear, shared vision of the
future. No clear strategy for an alternative order has emerged from BRICS thus
far and it is unclear whether the core members truly see eye-to-eye on a range
of issues. For instance, India is not in the BRI but is in the China-countering
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad).
- Whether
BRICS+ can become a genuine counter-hegemonic bloc to the G-7 remains to be
seen. There is still time and opportunity for the West to counter it by seeking
to include the nations of the global South in the LIO’s decision-making
processes rather than lecturing them about what they should do.
BRICS takes centre stage
In August 2023, at
the annual meeting of the BRICS group, it was announced – to general surprise –
that the platform would be getting six
new members: Argentina, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (although Argentina
withdrew its membership application at the end of 2023, and at the time of
writing Saudi
Arabia is reportedly still considering
whether to accept the offer). By all accounts, the new members were admitted at
the behest of China
and Russia. Henceforth, the
organisation would be known as BRICS+.
This move bewildered
many observers. Why, they wondered, would Iran and Saudi Arabia, entrenched
regional rivals for decades, fighters of proxy wars against each other, be
included in the same body? Was this a calculated move to undermine the
so-called ‘liberal international order’ (LIO)?
Or just a step towards rendering BRICS impotent and incoherent? Was the
organisation now, as it appeared, intended to stand directly against the G-7
group of rich nations? Was this expansion of BRICS a threat to the West, or
simply strategically confused?
The answers to these
questions are complex and multifaceted. On the one hand, it is clear that Beijing
is trying to build a network of sympathetic nations based on the rhetoric of South-South
cooperation and opposition to the
hegemony of the global North. At the same time, the Chinese government does not
want to rock the boat too vigorously for fear of shaking out too much of the
liberal international order (LIO) which has produced China’s economic miracle
over the last four decades. BRICS is based in ideological opposition to the
West’s dominance but still lacks a clear vision beyond the vague goal of
establishing a ‘community
of shared future.’ Hence, there is space
for the G-7 nations to counter the influence of BRICS by presenting a more
coherent path forward than that emanating either from the tentative
Sino-Russian-led coalition or from the US and the EU so far. The future LIO
needs to be more inclusive of global South countries rather than making them
feel they are being lectured and dominated by the richer half of the world.
The story of BRICS
The BRICS
intergovernmental organisation – comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa – was founded in 2009.
It has met annually ever since. However, it is interesting that the
term ‘BRIC’ originates in 2001 from
a publication by the erstwhile chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management. In
it, Jim O’Neill proposed the idea of a bloc of powerful global South nations
including Brazil, Russia, India and China. The idea gained some traction in the
global public sphere in the following years and was then acted upon by the
countries themselves, with the addition of South Africa. Hence, this bloc
formed by global South actors was conceived in the global North.
With this in mind,
it initially appeared that even the BRICS nations themselves were unsure what
to make of the grouping. Perhaps the arrangement would be short-lived. Yet in
fact annual meetings continued. Even in the face of events which would seem to run
counter to cooperation – such as clashes in the Galwan
Valley between Chinese and Indian forces in
2020, not to mention complex issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic – the
group persisted. And it was clear that this was an arrangement that had begun
to suit the members. Of course, it also excluded the world’s most powerful
nations: the G-7, consisting of the USA, the UK, Canada, Germany, France,
Italy, and Japan (plus
the EU as a “non-enumerated member”).
In conception, it
is clearer what BRICS stands against, rather than what it intends to do. Based
in the rhetoric of South-South cooperation emanating from discussions in the
UN, the organisation is intended (at least as far as China and Russia are
concerned) to foster unity among leading emerging economies with the aim of
countering the dominance of North America and Europe. Officially, BRICS is
supposed to assist in resolving regional conflicts, reforming global financial
and economic structures (such as the World Bank
and the International
Monetary Fund), and establishing the
BRICS Interbank
Cooperation Mechanism. On the other hand,
since BRICS countries still use the US
dollar for transactions and the World Bank
and IMF are still dominated by the US, there have been limited results so far
in attempting to transform global finance. Regarding regional conflicts, Beijing
points to its role as a peace-broker
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese government also promotes Belt and
Road (BRI)
investments as a sign of success.
Introduced in
2013, the BRI is intended to connect primarily developing countries across
Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe in a multi-regional network of states,
using Chinese infrastructure construction as the building-block. Later came
other linked ideas such as the Global
Development Initiative, the Global
Civilisation Initiative, and the
rhetorical slogan “community of shared destiny” (later changed to “community
of shared future for mankind”). But it is
not clear what role – if any – BRICS itself played in these developments. All
these Chinese initiatives point to one thing: President Xi had in mind an idea
of constructing a bloc of non-Western nations as an alternative to the existing
order predicated upon the dominance of the global North countries. And this is the
origin of the idea for adding members to the BRICS platform. For the Chinese
government, it is an ideational merging of the agendas of BRI and BRICS.
However, this does
not necessarily mean that the other members see it this way, or that all
potential members will be excited to join. It is clear from Argentina’s
withdrawal (after an
election producing a change of leadership)
and Saudi Arabia’s hesitation that the expansion of the platform will not
necessarily be plain sailing. This is especially the case since India
and Brazil have resisted expanding
BRICS membership too rapidly and – unlike China – tend to favour the inclusion
of democracies
over autocracies. Brazil and India have
also rejected
the idea of BRICS as an anti-Western bloc and refuse
to join the BRI. Clearly, BRICS has a long way to go if it is to promote a
unified vision of global South development.
BRICS+: added value or watering down?
Probably the most surprising
aspect of the August 2023 announcement for many observers was that Iran and
Saudi Arabia were to be admitted to BRICS together (although, as already
stated, Saudi Arabia had not yet accepted the invitation at the time of writing).
Regional
rivals since the Islamic
revolution of 1979, Shia Iran and
Sunni Saudi Arabia have been competing for influence in the Persian Gulf for
decades. Both are major oil exporters and dominate the region geopolitically.
Saudi Arabia has traditionally been an ally of the US (although it has been
hedging its bets in recent years), while Iran has stood against the West since
the Islamic revolution. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which pass
about 21
per cent of the world’s liquid petroleum. Recently,
they have been backing opposing factions in proxy
wars in Syria and Yemen.
Relations between them would appear to be impossibly bad, making the prospect
of their representatives sitting around a table at a BRICS summit unlikely. Yet
both were invited, presumably at China’s behest.
This is a puzzle
if one considers the possible downsides of trying to cooperate with bitter
rivals within a multilateral organisation such as BRICS. The more members the
platform gains and the more diverse their interests, the more difficult it is likely
to be to achieve consensus. This is especially the case when countries which
have had long-term security arrangements with the US – such as Saudi Arabia and
Egypt – are admitted. Expansion appears to contain significant downsides for
the organisation in terms of taking practical steps to counter Western hegemony
– if that is what BRICS is for.
The explanation is
relatively straightforward. From China and Russia’s point of view, at this
stage the mere fact of appearing to co-opt erstwhile Western allies – and doing
it in a peaceful fashion – is more important than achieving consensus. For
instance, as already noted, in March 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
announced that Beijing had brokered a peace
deal between the two rivals – even if in
private some who were in the know noted that China had stepped into the
long-term negotiations quite late in the day. The announcement of the deal was
an attempt to send three clear messages. First, that China was capable of
achieving results that Western countries could not. Second, that China was
presenting itself as an agent of peaceful global
development rather than conflict (in
contrast with common perceptions of the US in many countries, not least in the
Middle East). And third, that this was part of a long-term attempt to create
the appearance that China was capable of constructing an alternative
international order based on building cooperation with and between global South
countries. Of course, since the outline of this alternative order remains
vague, it is the attempt to blunt the power of the global North by constructing
an alternative bloc of states that it is the key point. Thus, attracting
countries to BRICS – and increasing China’s influence at the expense of the
West – is, at this stage, more important than the missing details of exactly
what the new, BRICS-led global order is supposed to look like – or what exactly
it is supposed to do.
Thus, the move to
bring in Saudi Arabia and Iran, with two other Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) nations – Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – also included, is
meant to send a signal. China wants to be seen as a broker capable of bringing
peace to regions where Western initiatives – often based on violent
interventions – have failed. US-led actions such as the invasion
of Iraq and attacks on Houthi rebels in Yemen
have set an example of the West as an aggressor in the MENA region. Beijing
means to demonstrate that it is a different type of actor: a peaceful one. The
Xi administration, continuing China’s long-term policy of non-interference
and respect
for sovereignty, wants to show the
global South that it is not like that and can be a trusted partner which will
not intervene militarily in local conflicts.
In a Gramscian
sense, BRICS+ could be interpreted as a counter-hegemonic
historic bloc, set up as an
alternative to G-7 and the dominant hegemonic bloc set up by global North
countries. A Gramscian interpretation suggests that ideational factors are at
play at least as much as material ones, presenting this novel organisational
structure as a contender for normative recognition, especially in the global
South. It can be understood as a China-
and Russia-led move to present the developing world, most of which was
colonised by Europeans, as capable of standing up to the power of the
wealthiest nations and creating a viable alternative order.
At the same time,
a key aim of BRICS is to play on grievances in the global South about the
global North’s dominance of the architecture of international institutions and
the unequal distribution of power rather than seeking to completely disrupt the
existing order. Many global South countries resent the fact that they are
under-represented in global power structures such as the UN Security Council or
the G7. This is why the 2023 BRICS Johannesburg
Summit Declaration contains a laundry list
of concerns about the current order, while at the same time reaffirming the
importance of the traditional global governance institutions. What remains to
be seen, at this stage, is how much the idea of BRICS+ will gain credibility in
Africa, Latin America, Asia and other developing regions, and whether there
will be a steady drip of new members into it or not.
Policy recommendations: responding to China’s role in BRICS+
As far as the EU
and other countries in the global North are concerned, the implications of the
August 2023 membership expansion are clear. The potentially expanding China-
and Russia-led challenge to the LIO needs to be faced. It would not be wise to
ignore such a development at this stage, especially since there are points of
weakness in BRICS which, quite frankly, can be exploited. Given the signs of
contestation within BRICS itself, it is the Sino-Russian axis which is the core
of the challenge to the Western-led global order and, from the point of view of
the US and the EU. The way to counter the challenge is to react to China and
Russia’s leading roles in the organisation by looking to improve relations with
other members and potential members of BRICS+.
In order to do
this, it is essential to understand and address the grievances of global South
countries. In the main, these revolve around their perception that they are
being excluded from the main decision-making structures in the global
international institutions which make up the LIO. Thus, there needs to be more
emphasis on joint problem-solving and reform to institutional structures which
allow more space for diplomatic cooperation with countries which are current or
potential members of BRICS. If this is not done, countries are likely to pursue
their interests through BRICS instead of the LIO, taking their lead from China
and Russia – even if they would perhaps prefer to avoid this solution.
In particular,
India is an obvious potential target of diplomatic attention. It is both a
founding member of BRICS, and the world’s most
populous nation. The Modi administration
in New Delhi has also consistently refused
to join the BRI, Xi Jinping’s flagship
foreign policy initiative. India fears increasing Chinese influence in its
backyard (the Indian
Ocean) and the two countries have ongoing territorial
disputes at their Himalayan borders. India is
a participant in the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, a security organisation
including the US, Japan and Australia which aims to counter China. Given all
these circumstances, it is far from likely that India will be a solid supporter
of Chinese attempts to set agendas in BRICS+. All that is really needed at this
stage is increased diplomatic engagement with Indian officials to evaluate
where they stand and what is the potential for enhancing ties. In the future,
it may be possible to offer India greater participation in the LIO, possibly
even as a full member of the G-7.
It could also be
worth exploring Brazil’s position. Brazil has never portrayed itself as a
supporter of China and, like India, has not
yet joined the BRI. On the other
hand, it has become a key oil supplier to China, which is its main customer. China
receives 63 percent of total Brazilian crude exports since a deal was struck
between Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company, and Sinopec, the Chinese
equivalent, in
2006. However, there are no other major
economic or political ties between the two countries. Thus, while it is not
likely that the Brazilian government will seek to antagonise China, there is
room for manoeuvre.
Clearly, it must
also be worth talking to Saudi Arabia and Argentina. The Saudis appear to be
employing delaying tactics or a hedging strategy on possible membership of
BRICS+. The Kingdom’s foreign relations appear to be in flux under Mohammed bin
Salman as Saudi Arabia seeks to change its international image
and reframe itself as a modern state. The Saudi leader is therefore likely to
be amenable to discussions about his country’s participation in the LIO rather
than BRICS and the BRI. Meanwhile, Argentina has already rejected BRICS, and it
would be interesting to find out more about the present government’s position
on China. The opportunity for increased diplomatic activity to explore avenues
for cooperation in both these cases is obvious.
Of course, China
is building relations with large numbers of global South countries through the
BRI and other initiatives, including regional
cooperation platforms such as the China-Arab
States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).
This is seen in the steadily reducing number of nations – now just twelve –
still maintaining official ties
with Taiwan. It is possible that
more developing nations may be offered BRICS membership in the future, perhaps
as soon as this year’s annual summit. Some are more committed to China than
others. It would therefore be a good idea to identify countries which are wavering
on cooperation and try to cultivate ties with them. Offering increased
investment in carefully selected countries via the EU’s budding Global
Gateway scheme would not go amiss.
In short, there is
still time to present a clear counter-offer to selected global South countries.
This should be tailored to individual countries as far as possible, seeking to
find a more participatory role for them in existing global governance
institutions. The emphasis needs to be on solving problems together, finding
routes into the future which actively include the countries of the global South
rather than merely telling nations to follow the rules of the LIO. As a recent BBC
interview with the president of Guyana
demonstrated, many countries feel they are being lectured rather than listened
to on issues such as oil and climate change. The time is here not just to
listen, but to learn from the global South – and to seek mutual solutions
rather than being seen as imposing ones which favour the rich half of the
world.
The task is to
formulate the counter-offer to BRICS and the Sino-Russian alliance in a way
that is attractive to as many nations as possible, and especially those with
clout in BRICS. It should not be difficult to separate those nations which will
stand steadfastly with China and Russia from those who are wavering. But it
will take some time and work through diplomatic channels, as well as a
clearly-formulated plan for cooperation with the EU and the rest of the global
North. Above all, it is important to earn the respect of countries in the
global South rather than talking down to them – and to encourage these nations
to feel that they can participate in the LIO instead of being made to feel that
they are its victims.
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Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
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