Key takeaways
- Over the last ten years the USA and the EU have not been paying sufficient attention to rising Chinese influence in the Global South.
- Studying public opinion survey data reveals that there has been a swing towards China and away from the USA across parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
- This shift comes not from any shift in Chinese policy, but from what the West is – and is not – doing, most notably in connection with the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.
- Since Trump was inaugurated for the second time in January 2025, decisions to cut aid to the Global South, introduce tariffs, and walk away from global climate action are leaving even more of a vacuum for China to fill.
- In the context of rising Chinese and falling US engagement, Europe urgently needs to develop a clearer strategy in its relations with the developing world, focussing on smaller states as well as big players like India and Brazil.
Introduction
There is a common perception in Europe and the United States that China’s soft power charm offensive of the first two decades of the twenty-first century has failed. The idea is that most people dislike China because of its human rights record, political system, and botched reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, among other factors. However, the reality is somewhat different. Figure 1, based on survey data from 35 countries, shows that perceptions of China, while still lagging far behind the U.S. in high-income countries, are much more positive in the economically less developed nations of the Global South. China is not yet ahead of the USA in their bilateral competition for global influence and soft power, but it has closed the favourability gap considerably. In part, as this paper will reveal, this has been the result of negative responses in many parts of the Global South to US involvement in the Gaza conflict.
Source: Pew Research Center, June 2024[1]
Data such as those in Figure 1, which present a very broad picture, need to be unpacked to reveal their cause and to understand differences between countries and regions. For instance, the Pew data reveal that the USA is less popular than China in Tunisia, Turkey and Malaysia, all majority Muslim countries. On the other hand, the USA has higher levels of favourability in Ghana, Colombia and India, which have very different cultural backgrounds and histories. Meanwhile, in many Global South countries Europe tends to be hobbled by memories of its colonial past, as well as the perception of the EU as Eurocentric and uninterested in committing to engagement with the developing world in any meaningful sense.[2]
While it is difficult to analyse all the reasons behind individual variations in a short paper such as this, it is possible to pinpoint at least some of the most significant factors in some countries and regions. It is also important to draw some conclusions about what Europe and the USA – or just Europe if the USA under the Trump administration cannot be persuaded to cooperate – need to do to compete with the rising Chinese influence. As the deliberately provocative title of this paper suggests, it seems to us to be the case that the USA and the EU are choosing to lose influence due to their inattention and lack of respect towards the Global South. In essence, China is being allowed to win by default. American and European neglect is creating an environment in which China’s growing influence is facilitated through the absence of convincing or effective competing offers. In large part, US and EU inaction and lack of attention is contributing to China’s success in cultivating close ties with countries and regions of the Global South.
The swing to China
There can now be no doubt that China’s influence across the Global South is increasing. As previous papers in this project have shown, China is challenging the Western-led rules-based or liberal international order (LIO) with institutions[3] of its own such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[4] and BRICS.[5] At the same time, the USA and the EU are contributing to China’s growing soft power due to what they are perceived to be doing – or not doing. For instance, US financial support for Israel in its Gaza campaign has impacted perceptions of the US in many Muslim countries.[6] In addition, Europe’s focus on the war in Ukraine, including global efforts to build alliances against Russia, has reinforced perceptions of Eurocentrism in other world regions in particular those marked by violent conflicts.
Perceptions of US and European neglect or lack of interest benefit China, which is greatly intensifying its trade relations with the Global South since 2020[7] by investing through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other projects.[8] In contrast, the European Global Gateway Initiative, which has not been promoted effectively and has consequently not received much publicity, has not yet produced many results in terms of implemented investments and positive perception. The incoming Trump administration’s decision to cut aid programmes in Africa and other parts of the Global South is also likely to be contributing to negative perceptions of the reliability of the US as a partner. In the case of Europe, long-term memories of colonialism tend to undermine the EU’s image as a potential partner, meaning that Brussels has work to do to rebuild trust – a factor which many European policy-makers have been slow to acknowledge.
This paper will outline some ways in which US and EU policy – or lack of coherent policy and strategic priority settings – towards the Global South are contributing to improved perceptions of China in some countries. It is vital for stakeholders in the EU to understand the factors which are driving the rise in Chinese soft power, not least so that the EU can develop a more coordinated counter-offer to the Chinese one.[9] Accordingly, we will analyse questions of US and EU versus Chinese influence in a range of countries and regions in the Global South, making some suggestions as to what the EU in particular can do to improve its image and increase its influence.
Here we take the term ‘Global South’ to mean the economically less developed regions of the world, most of which were colonised by European powers in previous centuries. This is the term that most of these countries apply to themselves, with China included among their number. In particular, we focus on sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, and the Pacific Islands.
At the same time, given the complexity of analysing countries which make up over half the world’s nations, each one of which has its own history and idiosyncrasies, this paper can offer only a rough overview of the issues involved. Accordingly, we leave further explanation and extrapolation to ongoing research and debates, hopefully stimulating the reader to join in those discussions. At the same time, we want to make it clear that our intention is to offer observations on China’s growing influence in the Global South rather than political commentary on the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.
Views of the US and Europe
Since the middle of the twentieth century, there has been a strong US influence in the Global South, militarily, politically and economically. China is a relative latecomer. Across the economically developing world, China’s economic and political ties have only really begun to take off since the early twenty-first century, building from a very low base. Accordingly, China’s soft power has lagged behind that of the USA.
However, as opinion polls and other evidence presented in the following sections of this paper reveal, public opinion concerning the international role and actions of the US have been declining across many parts of the Global South. Put simply, this outcome has two causes: negative perceptions of what the US is doing – for instance, supporting Israel in its Gaza occupation – and is not doing – undervaluing diplomatic and economic engagement with developing countries.
While many people still have a favourable view of Europe, public perceptions of Europe in major countries of the Global South remain below the global average.[10] Many countries of the Global South—such as India, South Africa, and Brazil—have not aligned with Ukraine to the same extent as most European leaders. In many parts of the world, Moscow continues to be perceived as a counterbalance to American and European colonial influence. While countries in the Global South have avoided openly condemning Russia, they have likewise refrained from explicitly endorsing its full-scale invasion. Recent polling data shows a growing divide between Europe and the Global South regarding the war in Ukraine. Broadly speaking, countries in the Global South are primarily concerned with the economic repercussions of the conflict.[11]
While Europe and the United States seek to consolidate their stances against Russia, the West should endeavour to adopt a similar approach toward the Global South. The West could strive to align sanctions imposed on Russia with the priorities of the Global South while simultaneously increasing investment and fostering economic development in the Global South — an approach already pursued by China.[12]
The following sections outline perceptions of the USA, the EU, and China in key regions of the Global South: The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Southeast Asia, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands. The intention is to demonstrate how perceptions of the West are in decline while China’s stock is rising. The reasons for this are connected with what the West is and is not doing, rather than any significant change in China’s long-term policy towards the Global South during the last few years.
Views of the US in the MENA region
During 2024 two opinion polls were published which revealed a significant change in attitudes towards China and the United States in the MENA region. One was an Arab Barometer poll which compared opinions of China and the USA in 2021-22 with the years 2023-24.[13] The other was a report entitled The State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.[14] The two polls showed an overall shift in public opinion in favour of China and away from the US. The primary explanation for this was a simple one: US support for Israeli action in Gaza.
The Arab Barometer poll provides evidence of a drastic transformation in public views of the US. Most revealingly, a survey was conducted in Tunisia before and after the commencement of Israeli action in Gaza.[15] In the three weeks before 7 October 2023, 40 percent of Tunisians claimed to have a favourable view of the United States. However, by 27 October, less than three weeks after the Israeli military campaign started, just ten percent of Tunisians approved of the USA. In Jordan, the proportion of respondents viewing the US favourably fell from 51 percent in 2022 to 28 percent in 2023-24. In Mauritania, favourability declined from 50 to 31 percent, while in Lebanon it dropped from 42 to 27 percent. Only Morocco bucked the trend: there the US favourability rating improved from 69 to 74 percent (see Figure 2).
At the same time, perceptions of China improved substantially. However, this was apparently due more to negative perceptions of what the US was doing rather than anything China was doing. In all five countries surveyed, over half the respondents held favourable views of China. At the same time, very few respondents (less than fifteen percent) believed that China intended to defend the rights of Palestinians. In other words, respondents had a relatively good view of China even while they did not see any likelihood of Chinese material or diplomatic support for Palestine. This implies that the rise in China’s favourability rating was mainly due to negative factors related to the US: the Israeli military occupation of Gaza and perceived US support for this action. Responses to the question “Which country has better policies for maintaining security in your region?”, asked after the events of 7th October 2023, bear this out: in three of the five countries surveyed, despite respondents’ reservations about China’s approach to Palestine, China’s security guarantees were perceived far more favourably than those of the US (see Figure 3).
Source: Robbins, Michael, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler. 2024. “America Is Losing the Arab World and China Is Reaping the Benefits.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/america-is-losing-the-arab-world-and-china-is-reaping-the-benefits/.
Source: Robbins, Michael, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler. 2024. “America Is Losing the Arab World and China Is Reaping the Benefits.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/america-is-losing-the-arab-world-and-china-is-reaping-the-benefits/.
Views of the US in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, the picture was similar. When asked with which of the two global rivals the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should choose to align, respondents in ASEAN countries leaned heavily towards the USA in 2023, with 61 percent selecting the US and only 39 percent choosing China.[16] However, one year later, the picture had changed radically: 50.5 percent chose China, while 49.5 percent chose the US. This swing to China was unequivocally caused by the situation in Gaza, since the three Muslim majority states in ASEAN – Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei – all recorded 15-20 percent increases in their support for China, with over 70 percent wanting to align with China in each country. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, this represented a major shift, since a majority of respondents in both countries had favoured the US in 2021 and 2022.
These remarkable changes in the polling results indicate that relatively favourable perceptions of China in Muslim majority countries were influenced, in large part, by negative perceptions of US support for Israel rather than anything new that China was doing. China was winning primarily because the US had elected to support the Israelian government in the conflict with Palestine. In other words, in terms of how it was perceived in Muslim countries – representing around 2 billion people world-wide or 25% of the world population –, US support for Israel was gifting China a higher degree of favourability at American expense. Competition for soft power had become a zero-sum game which the US was losing.[17]
Comparing MENA and Southeast Asia
Obviously, countries in the MENA region are all Muslim majority except for Israel. However, the same cannot be said of Southeast Asia, where this applies to only the three countries already mentioned. So is support for the US higher in the non-Muslim ASEAN states?
In fact, the polling data from The State of Southeast Asia survey reveal that support for the US in some non-Muslim nations also fell from 2023 to 2024 as China gained in favourability.[18] For instance, the number of respondents in Cambodia selecting China rose from 27 to 45 percent, while in Laos the figure rose from 41 to almost 71 percent. In Thailand, 52 percent of respondents chose China over the US, compared to 43 percent the year before, and even in the conflict-ridden Myanmar the figure rose from 32 to 42 percent. Out of the ten ASEAN members, only in the Philippines and Vietnam did support for alignment with China fall, while in Singapore it was roughly the same.
What is happening here? Well, it seems clear that perceptions of China and the US in the Philippines and Vietnam are influenced by their disputes with China in the South China Sea.[19] On the other hand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand do not have an interest in the South China Sea, and all have growing trade ties with China, being located in China’s neighbourhood.[20] They are also receiving large Chinese investments. In these four cases, perceptions of the US are affected by its perceived lack of economic and diplomatic engagement in comparison to China’s growing economic involvement. Only in countries where China was perceived as a direct military threat did support for alignment with the US increase. One can conclude that it is what the US is not doing in the region which is contributing to support for China – namely, the US is not being perceived as a reliable economic partner or as making a sincere effort to enhance diplomatic relations.
Views of China, Europe and the USA in South Asia
Compared to other external actors, such as the United States, China remains a relatively recent player in South Asia (except its engagement in Pakistan and the support for some Maoist movements). For much of its modern engagement, it was neither deeply integrated into South Asian economies nor of central strategic importance apart from the Sino-Indian border disputes. However, large-scale investment projects, educational collaborations, and political support for India’s smaller neighbours have contributed to a growing appreciation of China in the region over the last decade. These initiatives have fostered more positive perceptions of China in the region.
What remains largely absent from major opinion polls and surveys on views of global actors becomes evident in interviews conducted across South Asia over the last years by one of the authors of this paper. Many people express deep dismay at Western, and particularly European, support for Israel. While the United States is often viewed with few illusions regarding its global commitment to human rights, European states appear to be held to a different standard. Civil society actors, in particular, criticize what they perceive as Europe's failure to advocate for the people of Gaza.
A further game-changer in determining the extent of China's influence in South Asia and the Global South—and its implications for European standing—might be the new Trump administration. Since the U.S. president intends, among other measures, to impose various tariffs on the BRICS states, a certain rapprochement between China and India appears to be underway. Enhanced cooperation could help alleviate China's demand shortfall while simultaneously addressing India's supply challenges. However, it remains doubtful whether economic pragmatism can overcome the deep-seated mistrust between the two nations.[21]
The following analysis examines developments in India and Bangladesh as illustrative cases to highlight where the West has lost at least a degree of acceptance and reputation.
India
India presents a case study of the shifting political tectonics of South Asia. The Indian government, on the one hand, has sought closer cooperation with the United States, particularly within the framework of the Quad. At the same time, however, it has recently pursued diplomatic rapprochement and economic collaboration with China, despite underlying mistrust and persistent strategic competition due to ongoing border disputes. Thus, India’s long-term position of non-alignment has been challenged, even if New Delhi seems likely to continue hedging between the U.S. and China. Opinion polls show that sentiment towards China has become more positive in recent years. While only 17% had a positive opinion of China in 2020, this figure rises to 24% in 2024. [22]
Given India's vastness, broad generalizations about the country should be avoided. Instead, two case studies—Kerala and the Northeast—can serve to illustrate the responses to recent developments and highlight the complex entanglements with China, too. Research indicates that the southern state of Kerala, currently governed by the China-friendly Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], did not respond unequivocally to the Gaza conflict. Rather, depending on factors such as professional engagements and contacts in the Gulf states, a pro-Palestinian anti-imperialist stance, religious affiliations, and labour migration to Israel, a range of political positions emerged—with a predominant emphasis on affirming Palestinian resistance rights.[23] Clearly, this has some impact on levels of support for the U.S. and Europe, which are seen as aligning with Israel.
The eight north-eastern Indian states maintain an ambivalent view toward China. On the one hand, there are deep-rooted ethnic and cultural ties to China and Southeast Asia, on the other, distrust due to ongoing border disputes and the historical experiences associated with them. In interviews conducted by one of the authors, both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli positions have been expressed particularly within the larger predominantly Christian communities or those affected by ongoing violent conflicts, such as in Manipur.[24] With regard to China, it can be observed that some feel admiration for China's successful economic rise and try to put pressure on their own government by pointing out the attractiveness of China's development achievements – a factor that applies to many countries in the Global South and is easily overlooked in Europe and the USA in its contributing to the positive perception of China.
In contrast to the smaller South Asian states, India has been courted by the European Union (EU) since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both India and the EU find themselves positioned between the USA and China on the global stage, seeking new partners for diversification in the face of concerns over economic dependency on China.[25]Despite some attempts at repositioning, the relationship between the EU and India remains relatively weak even with long-term and lately intensified negotiations over a free trade agreement.[26] India views the EU more as a trade bloc than a significant geopolitical actor and prefers to focus on strengthening bilateral relations with individual member states.[27]
Bangladesh
China was at first against the independence of Bangladesh and in favour for Pakistan, but has developed and maintained a relatively strong relationship with Bangladesh since the 1980s, a bond that has deepened in recent years, as described above. Interestingly, Chinese investments in Bangladesh—amounting to approximately $33 billion since 2009—are nearly equivalent to the investments China has made in the significantly larger India since 2006.[28] Bangladesh’s relationship with the United States has been strained for some time, a dynamic that is also reflected in public perception. In a 2024 Pew research survey, public opinion in Bangladesh was divided: roughly half of respondents held a favourable view of the United States, while the other half expressed a positive perception of China.[29] This aligns with a broader trend observed in many middle-income nations, where a median of 56% view China more favourably than the United States.
However, the Israel-Gaza conflict appears to have provoked a further decline in opinions of the West. As a Muslim-majority country with strong ties to the Middle East—partly due to significant labour migration—Bangladesh has been profoundly affected by the events following October 7, 2023.[30] In numerous official statements, the country has called for a ceasefire, reaffirmed its support for Palestine, and strongly condemned the killing of civilians. [31] Numerous civil society actors from South Asia protested against the European and German stance by cancelling their participation in events as seen in the Global Assembly in Frankfurt.[32]
A survey conducted after the so called ‘Monsoon Revolution’ in July 2024 in Bangladesh, which was published in March 2025, offers the first clear evidence of a significant shift in public sentiment.[33] According to the findings, 75 percent of respondents view relations with Beijing positively. Meanwhile, 56 percent maintain a favourable perception of the United States, and 58 percent hold a positive view of the European Union (EU). This result supports the argument that China is gaining a more positive image, while the US, if not outright losing, remains at the same level. In stark contrast, only about 11 percent consider relations with their immediate neighbour, India, to be good. The survey, which was also conducted in 2022 and 2023, reveals a steady increase in positive sentiment toward China. What is more, asked about the most favourite development partner, respondents ranked China (25%) far ahead of the US (15%) and the EU (9%). Beijing responded optimistically, framing the results as a promising sign for the further development of a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between Bangladesh and China.
Source:
n.a. 2025.
“Bangladeshis Rate Ties with China, India in Survey.” bdnews24, March 11. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/650b87725caa
Source: n.a. 2025. “Bangladeshis Rate Ties with China, India in Survey.” bdnews24, March 11. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/650b87725caa
The Pacific Islands, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa
Three other key regions in the Global South are Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Pacific Islands. In all of these China is working actively to expand its influence. At the same time, the actions – or inaction – of the U.S. and EU in these regions are playing into China’s hands. Although it is still early to reach a definite conclusion, the second coming of Donald Trump as US president in January 2025 has arguably pushed the influence equation even further in China’s favour.
Trump’s move to drastically cut the budget for USAid immediately impacted the Pacific Islands, where some aid programmes are entirely reliant on US support.[34] It is estimated that thousands of Pacific Islanders are dependent on income from USAid.[35] Yet even before Trump, according to the Lowy Institute, China was providing more funding (US$4.5 billion) to the Pacific Islands than the US (US$3.4 billion).[36] After Australia, China is the second biggest nation-state provider of financial support to the Pacific Islands. Thus, the Trump administration’s cuts are only likely to drive the Pacific Islands – including Papua New Guinea – further in the direction of future partnerships with China. Western fears that China will attempt to build both diplomatic influence and military bases in the region are thus only being stoked by the decisions emanating from Trump 2.0.
In Latin America, a region with an already checkered history vis-à-vis the United States, a similar story has quickly appeared in the wake of Trump’s inauguration. Within hours of becoming president, Trump ordered the forced deportation of Latin American immigrants back to their home countries, often in handcuffs.[37] For instance, in Colombia the rough treatment of those sent back to their home country on military flights in January 2025 played into China’s hands. On 26th January, mere days after Trump became president, the Chinese ambassador to Colombia tweeted that Sino-Colombian relations had reached their “best moment.”[38]
In November 2024, a new Chinese-built megaport was inaugurated at Chancay in Peru.[39] Meanwhile, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on imports of foreign steel, impacting Brazil, which is the second largest overseas supplier of steel to the US.[40] As a result, the Brazilian government immediately accelerated its plans to direct more trade through the new Peruvian port.[41] Discussions with China are under way to construct a trans-continental railway from the Brazilian coast to connect with the port at Chancay.[42] Since trade data shows that South American countries exported twice as much to China as to the US in 2023, Trump’s measures serve only to force US-Latin American trade relations to a still lower level than previously, benefitting China – and its image as a reliable partner – in the process.[43]
In sub-Saharan Africa, the impacts of Trump’s cuts to USAid are yet to be seen. However, the biggest effect is likely to be in healthcare. While China has been primarily investing under the label of the BRI in African infrastructure[44] – ports, railways, energy plants, dams and roads – the main focus of the US has been on providing medical aid to Africans.[45] In the wake of Trump’s USAid cuts, there are fears that there will be no more money for antiviral drugs to combat HIV and Aids. Cases of chronic diseases such as diabetes and cancer are also rising, putting further strain on local healthcare systems.[46]
The USAid cuts will therefore contribute not only to increased deaths, but also the termination of many healthcare professionals’ positions. According to a February 2025 report in The Guardian, termination notices have been sent to organisations in South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Eswatini and Zambia, as well as to the United Nations programme UNAids.[47] This is already causing African countries to start searching for alternative sources of funding in Asia. South Korea, Japan and China have already begun stepping into the breach, providing assistance during recent disease outbreaks.[48]
In other words, cuts in US aid – and possibly, according to a draft report leaked in April 2025[49], even diplomatic missions – to sub-Saharan Africa and other Global South regions are likely to leave another gaping hole which other nations, including China, will be asked to fill. As far as questions of US or Chinese influence are concerned, Trump’s USAid cuts are more likely to benefit China than the US.
Conclusion
To sum up, surveys, interviews and other data from many regions of the Global South demonstrate a steady rise in China’s image, with a concomitant decline in the favourability of the USA and Europe. The reasons behind this are connected to China’s significant efforts to strengthen its ties with actors in these regions in recent years. However, there are three other factors which have contributed to the relative soft power gains made by China: the situation in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, and the perception on the part of Global South countries of a lack of respect and attention granted to them by Washington and Brussels.
Opinion polls in the MENA and Southeast Asian regions reveal a swing towards China in some countries, particularly those with majority Muslim populations, nudging overall opinion to turn in Beijing’s favour. In South Asia, while China’s relations with Bangladesh are now considered close, India has been cautious in its responses to China's overtures. However, the EU and the USA have hardly benefited from this. In the Pacific Islands, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, the Trump administration’s cutting of aid seems to be causing the image of the USA to decline further. In the meantime, China, which is continuing its investments both under the label of BRI and without it, stands to enhance its image and influence in these regions further thanks to perceptions of American neglect or decline and its own rise.
The incoming Trump administration’s undermining of the rules-based international order in favour of ‘America first’ leaves an opportunity for Europe to rebrand itself. European governments and the EU now have a clear chance to commit to long-term engagement with the Global South. However, for Europe to enhance its global influence, it must adopt a more strategic, coherent, and proactive approach while striking a balance between economic pragmatism, strategic autonomy, and diplomatic engagement. Moving beyond Eurocentric perspectives, it should engage with an increasingly self-confident Global South—Africa, Latin America, and Asia—on an equal footing. Strengthening its international standing requires fostering attractive economic partnerships, implementing carefully planned infrastructure investments, and providing pragmatic development assistance.[50] Additionally, reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains while offering viable alternatives to developing nations would reinforce Europe’s role in the global economy. Maintaining leadership in climate diplomacy and renewable energy, including support for the Global South through climate financing, would further enable Europe to set global standards and position itself more competitively in an emerging new world order.
 | Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. |
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[19] Center for Preventive Action. 2024. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.
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[28] American Enterprise Institute - AEI. n.d. “China Global Investment Tracker.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
[29] Silver, Laura. 2024. “More People View the U.S. Positively Than China Across 35 Surveyed Countries.” Pew Research Center, July 9. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/09/more-people-view-the-us-positively-than-china-across-35-surveyed-countries/.
[30] Rhid, Kazi. 2023. “Palestine, Israel, and the Ripple Effect on Bangladesh.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://cgs-bd.com/article/20339/Palestine%2C-Israel%2C-and-the-Ripple-Effect-on-Bangladesh.
[31] The Business Standard. 2024. “Bangladesh Demands Immediate Ceasefire in Gaza, Full Access to Humanitarian Assistance.” March 13. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bangladesh-demands-immediate-ceasefire-gaza-full-access-humanitarian-assistance-808654.
[32] Stillbauer, Thomas. 2024. “Frankfurt: Global Assembly Abgesagt.” Frankfurter Rundschau, March 4. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.fr.de/frankfurt/frankfurt-global-assembly-abgesagt-92870223.html.
[33] n.a. 2025. “Bangladeshis Rate Ties with China, India in Survey.” bdnews24, March 11. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/650b87725caa.
[34] Reid, Tim, Daphne Psaledakis, and Humeyra Pamuk. 2025. “USAID Workers Say Goodbye to Headquarters as Trump Drastically Cuts Foreign Aid.” Reuters Media, February 27. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/usaid-workers-say-goodbye-headquarters-trump-drastically-cuts-foreign-aid-2025-02-27/.
[35] Jackson, Lagipoiva Cherelle. 2025. “Explainer: What Will the Withdrawal of USAid Mean for the Pacific?” The Guardian, February 17. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/17/donald-trump-usaid-withdrawal-impact-pacific-explainer?CMP=share_btn_url.
[36] Lowy Institute. n.d. “Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/map/.
[37] Pozzebon, Stefano. 2025. “Inside the Ordeal of Deported Migrants as US and Colombia Squared Off.” CNN, January 29. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/29/americas/colombia-migrants-deportations-trump-intl-latam/index.html.
[38] See “Zhu Jingyang on X: „En Mi Entrevista, Hago Énfasis De Que "Tal Como Lo Dijo El Canciller Murillo Durante Su Visita a China En Octubre Del Año Pasado, Estamos En El Mejor Momento De Nuestras Relaciones Diplomáticas Entre China Y Colombia, Las Cuales Cumplen Ya 45 Años."“ / X.” 2025. Accessed March 29, 2025. https://x.com/zhu_jingyang/status/1883610027568902589.
[39] Plummer, Robert. 2024. “China Megaport Paves Way into Latin America as Wary US Looks on.” BBC News, November 15. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg79y3rz1eo.
[40] Rogero, Tiago. 2025. “Trump’s Disdain for South American Allies Is China’s Gain.” The Guardian, February 12. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/12/trump-china-south-america-foreign-policy?CMP=share_btn_url.
[41] Borges, André. 2025. “Pressão De Trump Acelera Planos Do Brasil Com Megaporto Chinês Erguido No Peru.” Folha de S.Paulo, February 1.
[42] Patrick, Igor. 2025. ‘China delegation visits Brazil to discuss railway link to Peru megaport.’ South China Morning Post, April 17. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3306833/china-delegation-visits-brazil-discuss-railway-link-peru-megaport.
[43] Rogero, Tiago. 2025. “Trump’s Disdain for South American Allies Is China’s Gain.” The Guardian, February 12. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/12/trump-china-south-america-foreign-policy?CMP=share_btn_url.
[44] Institute of Developing Economies. n.d. “China in Africa.” Accessed March 29, 2025. https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html.
[45] Mithika, Dennis. 2024. “An Overview of U.S. Health Assistance for Africa: Transforming Lives in Developing Nations.” DevelopmentAid, August 9. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/183303/overview-of-u-s-health-assistance-for-africa.
[46] Lay, Kat. 2025. “Africa’s Medical System Risks ‘Collapse in Next Few Years’, Warns Health Leader.” The Guardian, February 27. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/feb/27/africas-medical-system-risks-collapse-in-next-few-years-warns-health-leader?CMP=share_btn_url.
[47] Lay, Kat. 2025. “US Shutdown of HIV/Aids Funding ‘Could Lead to 500,000 Deaths in South Africa’.” The Guardian, February 28. April 28, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/feb/28/usaid-funding-health-development-hiv-aids-antiretroviral-mothers-lgbt-sex-workers-south-africa.
[48] Cullinan, Kerry. 2025. “As US Retreats from Global Health, Africa Looks for New Sources of Financial Support.” Health Policy Watch, January 23. Accessed March 29, 2025. https://healthpolicy-watch.news/as-us-retreats-from-global-health-africa-looks-for-new-financial-sources/.
[49] France24, 2025. ‘Trump eyes gutting US diplomacy in Africa, cutting soft power: draft plan’. April 20. Accessed April 28, 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250420-trump-eyes-gutting-us-diplomacy-in-africa-cutting-soft-power-draft-plan
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