Key
takeaways
- Over the last ten years the USA and
the EU have not been paying sufficient attention to rising Chinese influence in
the Global South.
- Studying public opinion survey data
reveals that there has been a swing towards China and away from the USA across
parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
- This shift comes not from any shift in
Chinese policy, but from what the West is – and is not – doing, most notably in
connection with the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.
- Since Trump was inaugurated for the
second time in January 2025, decisions to cut aid to the Global South, introduce
tariffs, and walk away from global climate action are leaving even more of a
vacuum for China to fill.
- In the context of rising Chinese and
falling US engagement, Europe urgently needs to develop a clearer strategy in
its relations with the developing world, focussing on smaller states as well as
big players like India and Brazil.
Introduction
There is a common perception in Europe
and the United States that China’s soft power charm offensive of the first two
decades of the twenty-first century has failed. The idea is that most people
dislike China because of its human rights record, political system, and botched
reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, among other factors. However, the reality is
somewhat different. Figure 1, based on survey data from 35 countries, shows
that perceptions of China, while still lagging far behind the U.S. in
high-income countries, are much more positive in the economically less
developed nations of the Global South. China is not yet ahead of the USA in
their bilateral competition for global influence and soft power, but it has
closed the favourability gap considerably. In part, as this paper will reveal,
this has been the result of negative responses in many parts of the Global
South to US involvement in the Gaza conflict.
Source: Pew Research Center, June 2024[1]
Data such as those in Figure 1, which
present a very broad picture, need to be unpacked to reveal their cause and to
understand differences between countries and regions. For instance, the Pew
data reveal that the USA is less popular than China in Tunisia, Turkey and
Malaysia, all majority Muslim countries. On the other hand, the USA has higher
levels of favourability in Ghana, Colombia and India, which have very different
cultural backgrounds and histories. Meanwhile, in many Global South countries Europe
tends to be hobbled by memories of its colonial past, as well as the perception
of the EU as Eurocentric and uninterested in committing to engagement with the
developing world in any meaningful sense.[2]
While it is difficult to analyse all
the reasons behind individual variations in a short paper such as this, it is
possible to pinpoint at least some of the most significant factors in some
countries and regions. It is also important to draw some conclusions about what
Europe and the USA – or just Europe if the USA under the Trump administration
cannot be persuaded to cooperate – need to do to compete with the rising
Chinese influence. As the deliberately provocative title of this paper
suggests, it seems to us to be the case that the USA and the EU are choosing
to lose influence due to their inattention and lack of respect towards the
Global South. In essence, China is being allowed to win by default. American
and European neglect is creating an environment in which China’s growing
influence is facilitated through the absence of convincing or effective competing
offers. In large part, US and EU inaction and lack of attention is contributing
to China’s success in cultivating close ties with countries and regions of the
Global South.
The swing
to China
There can now be no doubt that China’s
influence across the Global South is increasing. As previous papers in this
project have shown, China is challenging
the Western-led rules-based or liberal international order (LIO) with
institutions[3]
of its own such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[4]
and BRICS.[5]
At the same time, the USA and the EU are contributing to China’s growing soft
power due to what they are perceived to be doing – or not doing. For instance, US financial support for Israel in its Gaza campaign has
impacted perceptions of the US in many Muslim countries.[6]
In addition, Europe’s focus on the war in Ukraine, including global efforts to
build alliances against Russia, has reinforced perceptions of Eurocentrism in
other world regions in particular those marked by violent conflicts.
Perceptions of US and European neglect
or lack of interest benefit China, which is greatly intensifying its trade
relations with the Global South since 2020[7]
by investing through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and other projects.[8]
In contrast, the European Global Gateway Initiative, which has not been
promoted effectively and has consequently not received much publicity, has not
yet produced many results in terms of implemented investments and positive
perception. The incoming Trump administration’s decision to cut aid programmes
in Africa and other parts of the Global South is also likely to be contributing
to negative perceptions of the reliability of the US as a partner. In the case
of Europe, long-term memories of colonialism tend to undermine the EU’s image as
a potential partner, meaning that Brussels has work to do to rebuild trust – a
factor which many European policy-makers have been slow to acknowledge.
This paper will outline some ways in
which US and EU policy – or lack of coherent policy and strategic priority
settings – towards the Global South are contributing to improved perceptions of
China in some countries. It is vital for stakeholders in the EU to understand
the factors which are driving the rise in Chinese soft power, not least so that
the EU can develop a more coordinated counter-offer to the Chinese one.[9]
Accordingly, we will analyse questions of US and EU versus Chinese influence in
a range of countries and regions in the Global South, making some suggestions
as to what the EU in particular can do to improve its image and increase its
influence.
Here we take the term ‘Global South’
to mean the economically less developed regions of the world, most of which
were colonised by European powers in previous centuries. This is the term that
most of these countries apply to themselves, with China included among their
number. In particular, we focus on sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America, and the Pacific
Islands.
At the same time, given the complexity
of analysing countries which make up over half the world’s nations, each one of
which has its own history and idiosyncrasies, this paper can offer only a rough
overview of the issues involved. Accordingly, we leave further explanation and
extrapolation to ongoing research and debates, hopefully stimulating the reader
to join in those discussions. At the same time, we want to make it clear that our
intention is to offer observations on China’s growing influence in the Global
South rather than political commentary on the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.
Views of
the US and Europe
Since the middle of the twentieth
century, there has been a strong US influence in the Global South, militarily,
politically and economically. China is a relative latecomer. Across the economically
developing world, China’s economic and political ties have only really begun to
take off since the early twenty-first century, building from a very low base. Accordingly,
China’s soft power has lagged behind that of the USA.
However, as opinion polls and other
evidence presented in the following sections of this paper reveal, public
opinion concerning the international role and actions of the US have been
declining across many parts of the Global South. Put simply, this outcome has
two causes: negative perceptions of what the US is doing – for instance,
supporting Israel in its Gaza occupation – and is not doing – undervaluing
diplomatic and economic engagement with developing countries.
While many people still have a
favourable view of Europe, public perceptions of Europe in major countries of
the Global South remain below the global average.[10]
Many countries of the Global South—such as India, South Africa, and Brazil—have
not aligned with Ukraine to the same extent as most European leaders. In many
parts of the world, Moscow continues to be perceived as a counterbalance to
American and European colonial influence. While countries in the Global South
have avoided openly condemning Russia, they have likewise refrained from
explicitly endorsing its full-scale invasion. Recent polling data shows a
growing divide between Europe and the Global South regarding the war in
Ukraine. Broadly speaking, countries in the Global South are primarily
concerned with the economic repercussions of the conflict.[11]
While Europe and the United States
seek to consolidate their stances against Russia, the West should endeavour to
adopt a similar approach toward the Global South. The West could strive to
align sanctions imposed on Russia with the priorities of the Global South while
simultaneously increasing investment and fostering economic development in the
Global South — an approach already pursued by China.[12]
The following sections outline
perceptions of the USA, the EU, and China in key regions of the Global South:
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Southeast Asia, South Asia,
sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands. The intention is to
demonstrate how perceptions of the West are in decline while China’s stock is
rising. The reasons for this are connected with what the West is and is not
doing, rather than any significant change in China’s long-term policy towards
the Global South during the last few years.
Views of
the US in the MENA region
During 2024 two opinion polls were
published which revealed a significant change in attitudes towards China and
the United States in the MENA region. One was an Arab
Barometer poll which compared opinions of China and the USA
in 2021-22 with the years 2023-24.[13]
The other was a report entitled The
State of Southeast Asia: 2024 Survey Report conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof
Ishak Institute in Singapore.[14]
The two polls showed an overall shift in public opinion in favour of China and
away from the US. The primary explanation for this was a simple one: US support
for Israeli action in Gaza.
The Arab Barometer poll provides
evidence of a drastic transformation in public views of the US. Most
revealingly, a survey was
conducted in Tunisia before and after the commencement of Israeli action in
Gaza.[15]
In the three weeks before 7 October 2023, 40 percent of Tunisians claimed to
have a favourable view of the United States. However, by 27 October, less than
three weeks after the Israeli military campaign started, just ten percent of
Tunisians approved of the USA. In Jordan, the proportion of respondents viewing
the US favourably fell from 51 percent in 2022 to 28 percent in 2023-24. In
Mauritania, favourability declined from 50 to 31 percent, while in Lebanon it
dropped from 42 to 27 percent. Only Morocco bucked the trend: there the US
favourability rating improved from 69 to 74 percent (see Figure 2).
At the same time, perceptions of China
improved substantially. However, this was apparently due more to negative
perceptions of what the US was doing rather than anything China was doing. In
all five countries surveyed, over half the respondents held favourable views of
China. At the same time, very few respondents (less than fifteen percent)
believed that China intended to defend the rights of Palestinians. In other
words, respondents had a relatively good view of China even while they did not
see any likelihood of Chinese material or diplomatic support for Palestine.
This implies that the rise in China’s favourability rating was mainly due to
negative factors related to the US: the Israeli military occupation of Gaza and
perceived US support for this action. Responses to the question “Which country
has better policies for maintaining security in your region?”, asked after the
events of 7th October 2023, bear this out: in three of the five
countries surveyed, despite respondents’ reservations about China’s approach to
Palestine, China’s security guarantees were perceived far more favourably than
those of the US (see Figure 3).
Source: Robbins, Michael,
Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler. 2024. “America Is Losing the Arab World and
China Is Reaping the Benefits.” Accessed March 29, 2025.
https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/america-is-losing-the-arab-world-and-china-is-reaping-the-benefits/.
Source: Robbins, Michael,
Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler. 2024. “America Is Losing the Arab World and
China Is Reaping the Benefits.” Accessed March 29, 2025.
https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/america-is-losing-the-arab-world-and-china-is-reaping-the-benefits/.
Views of
the US in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, the picture was
similar. When asked with which of the two global rivals the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should choose to align, respondents in ASEAN countries leaned heavily towards the
USA in 2023, with 61 percent selecting the US and only 39 percent choosing
China.[16]
However, one year later, the picture had changed radically: 50.5 percent chose
China, while 49.5 percent chose the US. This swing to China was unequivocally
caused by the situation in Gaza, since the three Muslim majority states in
ASEAN – Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei – all recorded 15-20 percent increases
in their support for China, with over 70 percent wanting to align with China in
each country. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, this represented a major shift,
since a majority of respondents in both countries had favoured the US in 2021
and 2022.
These remarkable changes in the
polling results indicate that relatively favourable perceptions of China in
Muslim majority countries were influenced, in large part, by negative
perceptions of US support for Israel rather than anything new that China was
doing. China was winning primarily because the US had elected to support the
Israelian government in the conflict with Palestine. In other words, in terms
of how it was perceived in Muslim countries – representing around 2 billion
people world-wide or 25% of the world population –, US support for Israel was
gifting China a higher degree of favourability at American expense. Competition
for soft power had become a zero-sum
game which the US was losing.[17]
Comparing
MENA and Southeast Asia
Obviously, countries in the MENA
region are all Muslim majority except for Israel. However, the same cannot be
said of Southeast Asia, where this applies to only the three countries already
mentioned. So is support for the US higher in the non-Muslim ASEAN states?
In fact, the polling data from The
State of Southeast Asia survey
reveal that support for the US in some non-Muslim nations also fell from 2023
to 2024 as China gained in favourability.[18]
For instance, the number of respondents in Cambodia selecting China rose from
27 to 45 percent, while in Laos the figure rose from 41 to almost 71 percent.
In Thailand, 52 percent of respondents chose China over the US, compared to 43
percent the year before, and even in the conflict-ridden Myanmar the figure
rose from 32 to 42 percent. Out of the ten ASEAN members, only in the
Philippines and Vietnam did support for alignment with China fall, while in Singapore
it was roughly the same.
What is happening here? Well, it seems
clear that perceptions of China and the US in the Philippines and Vietnam are
influenced by their disputes with
China in the South China Sea.[19]
On the other hand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand do not have an interest
in the South China Sea, and all have growing trade ties
with China, being located in China’s neighbourhood.[20]
They are also receiving large Chinese investments. In these four cases,
perceptions of the US are affected by its perceived lack of economic and
diplomatic engagement in comparison to China’s growing economic involvement.
Only in countries where China was perceived as a direct military threat did
support for alignment with the US increase. One can conclude that it is what
the US is not doing in the region which is contributing to support for
China – namely, the US is not being perceived as a reliable economic partner or
as making a sincere effort to enhance diplomatic relations.
Views of
China, Europe and the USA in South Asia
Compared to other external actors,
such as the United States, China remains a relatively recent player in South
Asia (except its engagement in Pakistan and the support for some Maoist
movements). For much of its modern engagement, it was neither deeply integrated
into South Asian economies nor of central strategic importance apart from the
Sino-Indian border disputes. However, large-scale investment projects,
educational collaborations, and political support for India’s smaller
neighbours have contributed to a growing appreciation of China in the region
over the last decade. These initiatives have fostered more positive perceptions
of China in the region.
What remains largely absent from major
opinion polls and surveys on views of global actors becomes evident in
interviews conducted across South Asia over the last years by one of the
authors of this paper. Many people express deep dismay at Western, and
particularly European, support for Israel. While the United States is often
viewed with few illusions regarding its global commitment to human rights,
European states appear to be held to a different standard. Civil society
actors, in particular, criticize what they perceive as Europe's failure to
advocate for the people of Gaza.
A further game-changer in determining
the extent of China's influence in South Asia and the Global South—and its
implications for European standing—might be the new Trump administration. Since
the U.S. president intends, among other measures, to impose various tariffs on
the BRICS states, a certain rapprochement between China and India appears to be
underway. Enhanced cooperation could help alleviate China's demand shortfall
while simultaneously addressing India's supply challenges. However, it remains doubtful
whether economic pragmatism can overcome the deep-seated mistrust between the
two nations.[21]
The following
analysis examines developments in India and Bangladesh as illustrative cases to
highlight where the West has lost at least a degree of acceptance and
reputation.
India
India presents a case study of the
shifting political tectonics of South Asia. The Indian
government, on the one hand, has sought closer cooperation with the United
States, particularly within the framework of the Quad. At the same time,
however, it has recently pursued diplomatic rapprochement and economic
collaboration with China, despite underlying mistrust and persistent strategic
competition due to ongoing border disputes. Thus, India’s long-term position of
non-alignment has been challenged, even if New Delhi seems likely to continue
hedging between the U.S. and China. Opinion polls show that sentiment towards
China has become more positive in recent years. While only 17% had a positive
opinion of China in 2020, this figure rises to 24% in 2024. [22]
Given India's vastness, broad
generalizations about the country should be avoided. Instead, two case
studies—Kerala and the Northeast—can serve to illustrate the responses to
recent developments and highlight the complex entanglements with China, too.
Research indicates that the southern state of Kerala, currently governed by the
China-friendly Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], did not respond
unequivocally to the Gaza conflict. Rather, depending on factors such as
professional engagements and contacts in the Gulf states, a pro-Palestinian
anti-imperialist stance, religious affiliations, and labour migration to
Israel, a range of political positions emerged—with a predominant emphasis on
affirming Palestinian resistance rights.[23]
Clearly, this has some impact on levels of support for the U.S. and Europe,
which are seen as aligning with Israel.
The eight north-eastern Indian states maintain an ambivalent view toward China. On the one hand, there are
deep-rooted ethnic and cultural ties to China and Southeast Asia, on the other,
distrust due to ongoing border disputes and the historical experiences
associated with them. In interviews conducted by one of the authors,
both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli positions have been expressed particularly
within the larger predominantly Christian communities or those affected by
ongoing violent conflicts, such as in
Manipur.[24] With regard to China, it can be observed that
some feel admiration for China's successful economic rise and try to put
pressure on their own government by pointing out the attractiveness of China's
development achievements – a factor that applies to many countries in the
Global South and is easily overlooked in Europe and the USA in its contributing
to the positive perception of China.
In contrast to the smaller South Asian
states, India has been courted by the European Union (EU) since the end of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Both India and the EU find themselves positioned between the
USA and China on the global stage, seeking new partners for diversification in
the face of concerns over economic dependency on China.[25]Despite some attempts at
repositioning, the relationship between the EU and India remains relatively
weak even with long-term and lately intensified negotiations over a free trade
agreement.[26]
India views the EU more as a trade bloc than a significant geopolitical actor
and prefers to focus on strengthening bilateral relations with individual
member states.[27]
Bangladesh
China was at
first against the independence of Bangladesh and in favour for Pakistan, but has
developed and maintained a relatively strong relationship with Bangladesh since
the 1980s, a bond that has deepened in recent years, as described above.
Interestingly, Chinese investments in Bangladesh—amounting to approximately $33
billion since 2009—are nearly equivalent to the investments China has made in
the significantly larger India since 2006.[28]
Bangladesh’s relationship with the United States has been strained for some
time, a dynamic that is also reflected in public perception. In a 2024 Pew
research survey, public opinion in Bangladesh was divided: roughly half of
respondents held a favourable view of the United States, while the other half
expressed a positive perception of China.[29]
This aligns with a broader trend observed in many middle-income nations, where
a median of 56% view China more favourably than the United States.
However, the Israel-Gaza conflict
appears to have provoked a further decline in opinions of the West. As a
Muslim-majority country with strong ties to the Middle East—partly due to
significant labour migration—Bangladesh has been profoundly affected by the
events following October 7, 2023.[30]
In numerous official statements, the country has called for a ceasefire,
reaffirmed its support for Palestine, and strongly condemned the killing of
civilians. [31]
Numerous civil society actors from South Asia protested against the European
and German stance by cancelling their participation in events as seen in the
Global Assembly in Frankfurt.[32]
A survey conducted after the so called
‘Monsoon Revolution’ in July 2024 in Bangladesh, which was published in March
2025, offers the first clear evidence of a significant shift in public
sentiment.[33]
According to the findings, 75 percent of respondents view relations with
Beijing positively. Meanwhile, 56 percent maintain a favourable perception of
the United States, and 58 percent hold a positive view of the European Union
(EU). This result supports the argument that China is gaining a more positive
image, while the US, if not outright losing, remains at the same level. In
stark contrast, only about 11 percent consider relations with their immediate
neighbour, India, to be good. The survey, which was also conducted in 2022 and
2023, reveals a steady increase in positive sentiment toward China. What is
more, asked about the most favourite development partner, respondents ranked
China (25%) far ahead of the US (15%) and the EU (9%). Beijing responded
optimistically, framing the results as a promising sign for the further
development of a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between
Bangladesh and China.
Source:
n.a. 2025.
“Bangladeshis Rate Ties with China, India in Survey.” bdnews24, March 11. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/650b87725caa
Source: n.a. 2025.
“Bangladeshis Rate Ties with China, India in Survey.” bdnews24, March 11. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/650b87725caa
The
Pacific Islands, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa
Three other key regions in the Global
South are Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Pacific Islands. In all of
these China is working actively to expand its influence. At the same time, the
actions – or inaction – of the U.S. and EU in these regions are playing into
China’s hands. Although it is still early to reach a definite conclusion, the
second coming of Donald Trump as US president in January 2025 has arguably
pushed the influence equation even further in China’s favour.
Trump’s move to drastically cut the
budget for USAid
immediately impacted the Pacific Islands, where some aid programmes are
entirely reliant on US support.[34]
It is estimated that thousands of
Pacific Islanders are dependent on income from USAid.[35]
Yet even before Trump, according to the Lowy Institute,
China was providing more funding (US$4.5 billion) to the Pacific Islands than
the US (US$3.4 billion).[36]
After Australia, China is the second biggest nation-state provider of financial
support to the Pacific Islands. Thus, the Trump administration’s cuts are only
likely to drive the Pacific Islands – including Papua New Guinea – further in
the direction of future partnerships with China. Western fears that China will
attempt to build both diplomatic influence
and military bases in the
region are thus only being stoked by the decisions emanating from Trump 2.0.
In Latin America, a region with an
already checkered history vis-à-vis the United States, a similar story has
quickly appeared in the wake of Trump’s inauguration. Within hours of becoming
president, Trump ordered the forced deportation of Latin American immigrants
back to their home countries, often in handcuffs.[37]
For instance, in Colombia the rough treatment of those sent back to their home
country on military flights in January 2025 played into China’s hands. On 26th
January, mere days after Trump became president, the Chinese ambassador to
Colombia tweeted that
Sino-Colombian relations had reached their “best moment.”[38]
In November 2024,
a new Chinese-built megaport was inaugurated at Chancay in Peru.[39]
Meanwhile, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on imports of foreign steel,
impacting Brazil, which is the second largest overseas supplier of steel to the
US.[40]
As a result, the Brazilian government immediately accelerated its plans to
direct more trade through the new Peruvian port.[41] Discussions
with China are under way to construct a trans-continental railway from the
Brazilian coast to connect with the port at Chancay.[42] Since
trade data shows that South American countries exported twice as much to China
as to the US in 2023, Trump’s measures serve only to force US-Latin American
trade relations to a still lower level than previously, benefitting China – and
its image as a reliable partner – in the process.[43]
In sub-Saharan
Africa, the impacts of Trump’s cuts to USAid are yet to be seen. However, the
biggest effect is likely to be in healthcare. While China has been primarily
investing under the label of the BRI in African infrastructure[44] –
ports, railways, energy plants, dams and roads – the main focus of the US has
been on providing medical aid to Africans.[45]
In the wake of Trump’s USAid cuts, there are fears that there will be no more
money for antiviral drugs to combat HIV and Aids. Cases of chronic diseases
such as diabetes and cancer are also rising, putting further strain on local
healthcare systems.[46]
The USAid cuts will therefore
contribute not only to increased deaths, but also the termination of many
healthcare professionals’ positions. According to a February 2025 report in The Guardian, termination notices have been sent
to organisations in South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Eswatini
and Zambia, as well as to the United Nations programme UNAids.[47]
This is already causing African countries to start searching for alternative
sources of funding in Asia. South Korea, Japan and China have already begun
stepping into the breach, providing assistance
during recent disease outbreaks.[48]
In other words, cuts in US aid – and
possibly, according to a draft report leaked in April 2025[49],
even diplomatic missions – to sub-Saharan Africa and other Global South regions
are likely to leave another gaping hole which other nations, including China,
will be asked to fill. As far as questions of US or Chinese influence are
concerned, Trump’s USAid cuts are more likely to benefit China than the US.
Conclusion
To sum up, surveys, interviews and
other data from many regions of the Global South demonstrate a steady rise in
China’s image, with a concomitant decline in the favourability of the USA and
Europe. The reasons behind this are connected to China’s significant efforts to
strengthen its ties with actors in these regions in recent years. However,
there are three other factors which have contributed to the relative soft power
gains made by China: the situation in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, and the
perception on the part of Global South countries of a lack of respect and
attention granted to them by Washington and Brussels.
Opinion polls in the MENA and
Southeast Asian regions reveal a swing towards China in some countries,
particularly those with majority Muslim populations, nudging overall opinion to
turn in Beijing’s favour. In South Asia, while China’s relations with
Bangladesh are now considered close, India has been cautious in its responses
to China's overtures. However, the EU and the USA have hardly benefited from
this. In the Pacific Islands, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, the Trump
administration’s cutting of aid seems to be causing the image of the USA to
decline further. In the meantime, China, which is continuing its investments
both under the label of BRI and without it, stands to enhance its image and
influence in these regions further thanks to perceptions of American neglect or
decline and its own rise.
The incoming Trump administration’s
undermining of the rules-based international order in favour of ‘America first’
leaves an opportunity for Europe to rebrand itself. European governments and
the EU now have a clear chance to commit to long-term engagement with the
Global South. However, for Europe to enhance its global influence, it must
adopt a more strategic, coherent, and proactive approach while striking a
balance between economic pragmatism, strategic autonomy, and diplomatic
engagement. Moving beyond Eurocentric perspectives, it should engage with an
increasingly self-confident Global South—Africa, Latin America, and Asia—on an
equal footing. Strengthening its international standing requires fostering
attractive economic partnerships, implementing carefully planned infrastructure
investments, and providing pragmatic development assistance.[50]
Additionally, reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains while offering
viable alternatives to developing nations would reinforce Europe’s role in the
global economy. Maintaining leadership in climate diplomacy and renewable
energy, including support for the Global South through climate financing, would
further enable Europe to set global standards and position itself more
competitively in an emerging new world order.
| Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. |
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