Policy recommendations
Chinese sharp power-based disinformation
and malign cyberactivity in the WBs aimed at spreading an anti-Western
narrative is partly succeeding in slowing down EU regional integration and
Euro-Atlantic enlargement, while increasing Beijing’s commercial, strategic,
and diplomatic assets, and introducing an alternative political-economic model
to the West that pivots on the “Beijing consensus”. In the coming years
Beijing’s ability to use technologies in order to undermine public trust in
democratic institutions and the “clash of narratives” between China and the EU
will find fertile ground in the WB6, where idiosyncratic political-economic
visions will confront for regional hegemony.
Indeed, China’s influence in the WBs, along
with that of other non-EU actors such as Russia and Turkey, may hinder
democratisation and Euro-Atlantic integration. In contrast to the EU and NATO,
which place democratic conditions at the centre of their engagements with the
Balkans, new outside players are less concerned with democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law, focusing instead on trade opportunities, security
assistance, and energy contracts. In addition, external autocratic actors have
provided alternative sources of political and economic support to authoritarian
and corrupt Balkan elites.
To adequately challenge these threats, the
EU must:
- Overcome its credibility crisis
in the WBs, caused by years of enlargement fatigue within the EU.
- Reverse the slow pace of
reforms in the WB6 and reactivate the Berlin Process.
- Advocate for a steady and rapid
EU membership for the WB6.
- Fortify the EU’s geopolitical
role in the region and outperform regional influences originating from the outside.
Introduction
Over the past decade, non-Western external
actors, including China, Russia, and Turkey, have gained increasing influence
in the Western Balkans (WBs). Regarding China, its influence has been consolidating
in the region, including through the framework of the 16+1 initiative and as
part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a result of geostrategic
competition, the WB region has seen a persistent increase in Chinese influence
that has allowed it to intensify its messaging on topics such as technological rivalry,
pandemic management, vaccine diplomacy, governance systems, and geopolitical
dilemmas. To gain political-cultural attractiveness, Beijing has promoted a
soft power strategy akin to sharp power that, focusing on digital technology,
relies heavily on propaganda and disinformation. In this sense, Beijing has
actively exploited technology and technological devices to support
disinformation campaigns. Empirical evidence supporting the impact of these
practices in the WBs can be detected by public opinion polls, which show an
overall positive view of China in WB states, unlike in EU countries. Chinese
disinformation campaigns utilize a variety of tools, such as media outlets,
social networks and propaganda-driven international news to improve China’s
image abroad. Additionally, Beijing has threatened the WB’s institutional and
political democratic resilience via hybrid mechanisms connected to
cybersecurity vulnerability. Chinese propaganda strategy in the WBs is aimed at
spreading an anti-Western narrative to slow down EU regional integration and
Euro-Atlantic enlargement, while increasing Beijing’s commercial, strategic,
and diplomatic assets, and introducing an alternative political-economic model
to the West pivoting on the “Beijing consensus”.
China’s rise in the Western Balkans and the technological
quandary
Over the past years, particularly since
2008 – the year of the financial crisis in the EU – non-Western actors,
including China, Russia, and Turkey, have gained
increasing influence in the Western Balkans (WBs). Regarding China, its
influence has been expanding significantly in the region as part of Beijing’s
geoeconomic and diplomatic vision of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the
broader strategic context of China-EU relations. Several factors contributed to
the increased Chinese engagement, including
the stale of the Berlin Process regarding EU enlargement, existing development
gaps, political affinity with undemocratic regimes in the region, and
persistent governance, rule of law and corruption challenges. Indeed, since the
beginning of the 2010s China has steadily expanded its regional influence
mainly through investments and infrastructure projects, thereby increasing its
economic and political assets. Furthermore, China promoted its role through
media channels, cultural centres, NGOs, think tanks, governmental exchanges,
student programmes, language schools, and cultural diplomacy. Also, a key tool
in promoting Chinese engagement with the WBs has been the so-called Cooperation
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEE,
China-CEEC, also 14+1; formerly 17+1 from 2019 to 2021 and 16+1 from 2012 to
2022) launched in 2012 to foster business and investment relations in the frame
of the BRI.
Indeed, technology has been one of the key
sectors in which Chinese influence has increased. In this sense, the European
Commission has outspokenly described China as “an economic competitor in
pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative
models of governance”. The issue of technology is closely linked to China’s
so-called Three
Warfare’s Doctrine, which defines interstate conflict through three
principles: legal warfare (the use of international law to advance strategic
objectives), media warfare (the use of technology to shape public and
international opinion) and psychological warfare (the use of manipulation of
information to influence adversary decision-making and behaviour). In December
2003, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CCP) and Central
Military Commission approved
the doctrine to guide PLA political and information operations. Typically,
China has been using technology both as a tool of sharp power for
disinformation and propaganda purposes and as asymmetric mechanisms linked to
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Through hybrid warfare measures like the
dissemination of disinformation and the launch of cyberattacks, China can
coerce democratic societies, exploit their social, economic, and political
divisions, and co-opt other states and their foreign policies by encouraging
frozen conflicts, weaponizing political corruption, and restricting economic
development in contested areas. Cyberattacks by China can negatively affect
government agencies, global corporations, and small businesses, either directly
or through cascading risks. Typically, cyberattacks manifest as unauthorized
actions against computer infrastructure that compromise the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of its content. They can
bring about financial losses, identity theft, distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS), phishing, spoofing, malwares, code injection attacks, supply chain
attacks, social engineering attacks, insider threats, domain name system (DNS)
tunnelling, IoT-based attacks, and AI-powered attacks. To be sure, due to their
structural weaknesses – including underdeveloped levels of rule of law, civil
society, and democratic governance, as well as chronicle instability and
corruption –, the WBs provide fertile ground for undemocratic actors like Russia
and China to manipulate and exploit governments and societies through hybrid war measures,
including cyberattacks, cyber intrusions, disinformation and fake news.
Specifically, propagandistic strategies supported by malign cyberactivity aims
at spreading an anti-Western narrative are easily assimilable in post-Yugoslav
countries, particularly Serbia.
Thus, in the WBs technological quandaries
and digital dilemmas are intertwined with geopolitical competition. Chinese
sharp power and cyberactivity practices, could contribute to disrupting and
undermining Euro-Atlantic integration, while increasing Beijing’s commercial,
strategic, and diplomatic assets, and introducing an alternative
political-economic model to the West pivoting on the “Beijing consensus” -
especially in relation to the current Berlin Process stalemate regarding EU
enlargement in the region.
China’s use of sharp power and technology as asymmetric
threats in the Western Balkans
China’s official discourse has been using
the term “soft
power” since 2007. Chinese soft power is closely linked to cultural
diplomacy and is aimed at creating a feeling of allure
towards China, particularly in developing countries. However, Chinese soft
power often evolved into sharp
power. From a notional perspective, “sharp power” represents a corrupted
form of soft power – i.e., the ability to co-opt through appeal and
attraction rather than coercion. Sharp
power is typical of authoritarian regimes, emphasising the use of
propaganda, censorship, disinformation or manipulation to erode the integrity
of independent institutions and seeking to limit free expression, spread
confusion, and alter the political environment within democracies. Sharp power
practices include:
- Disguising maligned initiatives
as educational programmes, commercial ventures, or media endeavours;
- Using proxy and intermediary
networks to influence public discourse;
- Interfering with elections;
fomenting discord;
- Using digital media platforms
and digital tools to spread falsehoods.
Thus, a sharp
power strategy involves coercive political actions that imitate soft power
elements in order to influence a country’s image, undermine its socio-political
system, or force its government to take specific actions. Indeed, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has long recognised the value of external
promotion under
the label of “da wai xuan” (大外宣), especially to shape a worldwide Sinophile narrative, marginalise
dissenting voices, and securing a constituency of emotional, practical, and
ideological support.
A key component of sharp power is
represented by disinformation. The dissemination of disinformation poses a
security threat as it exploits and disrupts the regular functioning of
government and economic systems. Disinformation
consists of lies sustained by false narratives often based on aggrievement and
victimhood, which are used to manipulate people into believing what hostile and
malignant disseminators know to be false. Similarly to cyberattacks on private
and government networks, disinformation campaigns and the dissemination of fake
news through social media outlets – including remarkably TikTok – or
state-controlled media outlets serve as instruments of geopolitical power used
by hostile and maligned actors to undermine institutions. To spread
disinformation throughout Europe, the CCP has directly or indirectly set up
hundreds – or perhaps thousands – of influencing networks, including
Chinese-language newspapers, websites, apps, WeChat channels, foreign language
newspaper inserts and advertisements, sponsored columns, education and business
linkups, think tanks, films, TV news, talk shows, and documentaries. For
instance, almost 100
Chinese-language media outlets have been detected as pro-CCP throughout
Europe.
Sharp power represents one aspect of the
broader concept of hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, disinformation,
cyberattacks, influence operations, and narratives of victimhood are used to
create pretexts for conflict, promote discord, and maintain frozen conflict. A
hybrid warfare strategy gives maligned powers the ability to exploit divisions,
weaken resilience, and promote their interests and narratives. In hybrid
warfare scenarios, cybersecurity represents a key target. Cybersecurity
indicators tend to assess the levels of vulnerability of countries that are
subject to malicious cyberactivity – including cyberattacks and
cyber-intrusions. In the case of China, cybersecurity is often linked to the
expansion of its 5G network.
In this frame, the WBs are especially
vulnerable to actors seeking to damage infrastructure and create polarisation,
given the specific local political, economic, and social conditions
characterised by the lack of independent media and weak institutions and norms
that allow the spread of disinformation. In the WBs hybrid warfare refers to a
set of low-cost actions or tactics used to undermine public trust in
institutions, weaken norms, and usually obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration.
Also, in the WBs cybersecurity vulnerabilities are associated with hybrid war
actions perpetrated by hostile forces, particularly cyberattacks and
cyber-intrusions, along with disinformation campaigns. In the cybersecurity
domain, one of the most significant challenges is the lack of local qualified
experts in computer science, data science, and digitization, especially in the
fields of national security and economic development. In the case of Russia or
China, these countries use proxies to
undermine the influence of the EU, NATO, and the US in the region, as well as
promote social disorder and civilisational clash. In this frame, government
leaders, judges, politicians, and citizens are routinely targeted with fake
news and falsehoods to undermine their pro-Western inclinations. For instance,
Beijing is actively promoting disinformation through social, academic, and
educational avenues, as well as through local political outlets, to enhance its
influence through economic, energy, and infrastructure projects – including the
16+1 initiative.
China’s activities in the WB6
China’s increasing influence in the WB
region has had consequences for all six non-EU WB countries – or Western Balkan
Six (WB6) –, which comprise Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro,
North Macedonia, and Serbia. The footprint of China was visible in several
areas, including technology, commercial, investment, and infrastructure.
Nonetheless, recent analyses suggest that China’s disinformation
is still more a hype than a reality at present, with Russia remaining the main
tangible source of disinformation in the WBs. Recent research based on media
analyses and public opinion indicates that China’s
appeal may be growing, but its influence may not be as great as often
claimed – including in places such as Serbia. Additionally, a recent study
about China’s disinformation suggests that Western narratives tend to
overemphasize the role of technology and sophisticated software, while
overlooking the fact that much of China’s digital authoritarianism still relies
on extensive human intelligence: such reliance on human input might explain why
China’s disinformation is
more nuanced and sophisticated in places such as Taiwan or Southeast Asia than
in Europe. Still, data from public opinion polls provides insight into the
effectiveness and spread of Chinese disinformation in the WBs – highlighting
public opinion shifts in faovur of Beijing in the past decade. For instance, as
summarized in Table 1, a survey in post-Yugoslav Balkan countries (thus,
omitting Albania) detected that in 2020 the public perceptions on China in the
WBs were mainly
favourable.
|
Western Balkan country
|
Favourable view of China (in %)
|
Unfavourable view of China (in %)
|
|
Bosnia-Herzegovina
|
52
|
37
|
|
North Macedonia
|
56
|
35
|
|
Montenegro
|
68
|
22
|
|
Serbia
|
85
|
11
|
Table 1:
Western Balkan countries’ view on China in 2020. Source:
https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/final_wb_poll_for_publishing_6.9.2020.pdf.
Compared to the average EU country
perception on China, which, as shown in Table 2, is definitely
unfavourable, in the WBs this trend is therefore reverted.
|
EU country
|
Favourable view of China (in %)
|
Unfavourable view of China (in %)
|
|
France
|
23
|
70
|
|
Germany
|
20
|
76
|
|
Italy
|
35
|
61
|
|
Netherlands
|
22
|
74
|
|
Poland
|
18
|
71
|
|
Spain
|
33
|
55
|
Table 2: EU
countries’ view on China in 2024. Source:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/921671/european-perception-of-china-by-country/.
The comparison of public opinion’s
perception in EU and WB countries respectively adds empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of Chinese soft/sharp power, demonstrating how Beijing was able
to build a positive image of itself in the WB region, which, unlike the EU, is
more liable to foreign influence intrusions.
Albania
In the technological domain, in 2019
Albanian public radio and television signed a cooperation agreement with the
Chinese counterpart, endorsing the broadcast of Chinese documentaries,
including films about President Xi Jinping, as well as other cultural and
economic programs. Also, Beijing sends cartoons to major media channels in the
country to promote communication and distribute content targeted at younger
audiences. It is primarily through “Ejani Radio” – essentially a branch of
China Radio International (CRI) which also enjoys a YouTube channel and a
Facebook page – that information about China is distributed. Overall, the presence
of China-related content across the media spectrum in the country is
evident, with a constant rise between 2014 and 2019 in contents related to the
BRI.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, China wishes to
enhance its role in the country even through Huawei 5G technologies and several
events linked to the BRI. In the case of the media, “Xinhua” news agency
created institutional links via cooperation agreements with the “Federal News
Agency” (FENA), “Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (BHRT), and
“Patria” News Agency, as well as with “Republika Srpska News Agency”. In
addition, Sarajevo and Beijing signed a cooperation memorandum in 2019 that
envisages exchange visits, content sharing, joint news coverage, as well as
joint activities in publishing, broadcasting, and film production. Finally, the
website “China Today” and the magazine “Voice of China” contribute to spreading
China’s influence in the country.
Montenegro
In relation to Montenegro, in the field of
the media there has been a steady flow of pro-Chinese content being broadcast
via Serbian news. Also, some Montenegrin pro-Chinese (and pro-Russian) websites
comprise www.in4s.net and borba.me. For example, borba.me frequently refers to
China in an apologetic manner in its news reports, manifesting a biased
pro-Chinese inclination and espousing Beijing’s
rhetoric vis-à-vis the West, NATO, and the US.
North Macedonia
As for North Macedonia – a country particularly
vulnerable to non-western intrusions –, in terms of the media, cooperation
agreements between North Macedonia and China date back to 2004 and involve
content sharing, exchange visits and material support. China-friendly contents
– often devoid of any critical analysis and characterised by unclear sources,
half-truths, unverified data, speculative assumptions, and disinformation – are
broadcasted
by TV channels like “Kanal 5” and “Sitel TV”, news agencies such as
“MakFax” and the internet portals “Republika” and “Kurir”.
Serbia (and Kosovo)
Finally, in relation to Serbia – and
incidentally Kosovo, since China does not recognize its independence –, China
views the country as its chief strategic partner in the WBs. In turn, Serbia
considers China its second
most important ally after Russia. In Serbia, Chinese investments include
the Safe City Project
in which Chinese high-tech companies, including Huawei, have installed 1,000
CCTV cameras in 800 secret locations throughout Belgrade. Since this technology
is equipped with facial recognition software and the capacity to identify
license plates, it is considered threatening because the Chinese companies
involved are required under the Chinese National Security Act to relay all data
in their possession to Beijing’s
intelligence service. Also, these facial recognition cameras were
unlawfully used by the Serbian police to film and later identify protesters who
demonstrated against the low environmental standards of a lithium mine in the
country. Generally, the Serbian
market has been one of Huawei’s most important regional markets – also
through important agreements signed between Huawei and Serbian Telecom for the
digitalisation of Serbia. Also, since 2006 Confucius Institutes have been
operating in Serbia, spreading the Chinese language and culture among Serbian
pupils and students and enhancing a full-fledged strategy that pivots on cultural
diplomacy. Moreover, Chinese funding is also directed at Serbian think
tanks, which are geopolitically oriented and perceived as pro-Chinese and as
potential academic multipliers. In the sphere of media cooperation, Beijing and
Belgrade signed a series of agreements. Consistently, in recent years there has
been an increase in the number of stories related to China in the Serbian
media, which generally depict China in a very positive way. Some pro-Chinese
outlets include “China Radio International”, “China Today” (“Kina Danas”),
“Informer”, and “Welcome to Fun Radio”. Finally, the Chinese technology giant
Huawei is a major player on the Serbian media advertising market, further
solidifying Chinese dominance within the wider public sphere.
| Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
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